The visit of the American special envoy to Lebanon, Amos Hochstein, to Beirut is mysterious for some, both in its timing and content. This ambiguity or lack of constructive content adds to the complexities of the general regional scene and the specific Lebanese context, which is open to all possibilities. However, Hochstein did not bring anything new to discuss during this critical time, or in the last quarter of an hour before a difficult solution or an even tougher confrontation. He did not take the initiative to present anything constructive to those he met; he only reiterated what he had previously offered months ago, namely his insistence on the necessity of separating the Lebanese track from the Israeli war on Gaza.
Searching for serious or constructive signals in his public or private speech was almost impossible, as he seemed to act as a trusted messenger from a party that cannot be so trusted, leaving the role of mediation without any embarrassment and showing his bias in both substance and allegiance. Therefore, it can be said that the danger of his visit, in terms of timing and circumstances, differs from all previous visits because it carries no new propositions. This is detrimental in the science of negotiation and conflict resolution.
There are two types of people shocked by the visit: deceived friends and resentful haters. Some Lebanese viewed his bias positively from a negotiating perspective, believing he could build a trust-based negotiation since he represents their nationality and negotiates on their behalf. However, the result was that those on the other side of the border facilitated for him solutions tailored to their needs, which are scandalous for the Lebanese, known as the maritime border demarcation.
As for the new haters, who have concealed their negotiation flaws and the scandal of the maritime borders, they are deeply anxious about falling into a new trap he may have set for those he negotiated with, which would result in a new land negotiation scandal. It’s as if they just discovered his bias and allegiance and have stopped dealing with him as a trusted mediator.
The predicament for both previously deceived and currently and future dependent parties is not about the bias they recognize and accepted, as it was clear since he took on his role. The real problem lies with those who negotiated or authorized him to negotiate, as they have been bitten multiple times and still gamble on a settlement or compromise with him.
For some, Hochstein's visit to Beirut is clear in both form and content; he came via a commercial flight from a European capital and returned to it. If he were serious or had something substantial to convey, he would have come from Tel Aviv or returned there to relay what he heard from both parties.
In substance, he stuck to general statements about negotiations and a ceasefire in Gaza, ensuring that the conflict would not spill over into Lebanon. However, he did not discuss the next day, a roadmap, or any processes; this suggests to any negotiator that he has no data to bet on or anything to build upon. The essence of what he presented was a commitment to a ceasefire, meaning that his current offer to the Lebanese is to accept only what the Palestinians accept. This indicates that he will renegotiate with them from square one as if nothing had happened or changed on the Lebanese front since October 8.
Thus, it can be said that the most accurate description of the relationship between the Lebanese and Hochstein, especially those who relied on his ambiguity and were divided in their characterization of him, is that they are like someone seeking refuge from the heat in the fire.
