On a tense night in February, thousands of fighters loyal to Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr took to the streets of Baghdad and other southern Iraqi cities in a show of force, parading in pick-up trucks loaded with weapons while Iraqi security forces stood by without intervention. This was the largest display of power by al-Sadr’s populist faction since the early 2000s when his followers battled against U.S. occupation forces, inflicting thousands of casualties.
Two days later, in a rare move, al-Sadr appeared before media cameras at his base in the holy city of Najaf. He stated that his Saraya al-Salam forces had mobilized due to a terrorist threat targeting Shiite holy sites, adding that Iraq would not be safe without his armed group and claimed, "the security forces are in a state of collapse and weakness." To both his allies and adversaries, his message was clear: al-Sadr had returned after years of being sidelined, marking his comeback to the streets and corridors of power.
Over the past two years, the Sadrist movement has quietly worked to dominate Iraq’s state institutions. Members of the movement have taken up senior positions in the ministries of interior, defense, and communications. Those he appointed were placed in positions within state-owned oil, electricity, transportation companies, state-owned banks, and even the Central Bank of Iraq, according to more than ten government officials and lawmakers.
These new positions have provided the Sadrist movement with financial power. An analysis by Reuters shows that the ministries occupied by Sadrists or their allies represent between one-third and half of Iraq's 2021 budget project, which totals $90 billion. The Iraqi government has not commented on this.
The Sadrist movement is preparing to achieve significant gains in the general elections scheduled for October. This growing influence may pose problems for both the United States and Iran, which al-Sadr accuses of interfering in Iraqi affairs. He has previously called for the departure of the remaining 2,500 U.S. troops in Iraq and asserted to Tehran that he will not allow Iraq to fall under its grip.
However, some Western diplomats in informal meetings have stated they would prefer to deal with a government dominated by al-Sadr rather than one led by his Iranian-backed Shiite rivals. Al-Sadr is a distinctly Shiite figure with a clear nationalist inclination.
Since the defeat of the Sunni extremist group ISIS in 2017, the forces that battled the organization, including the U.S. and Iran-backed factions, have turned their weapons against each other through rocket attacks and drone strikes. With his opponents preoccupied, al-Sadr quietly shifted to political work. Doug Suleiman, the former U.S. ambassador to Iraq and head of the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, remarked, "We found al-Sadr to be one of the main brakes on Iranian expansion and Shiite political influence steeped in sectarianism in Iraq after the 2018 elections."
Reuters spoke to around 25 individuals familiar with al-Sadr's activities, some of whom are his allies and others his adversaries, and reviewed legal documents to uncover how his supporters have taken key positions in ministries and state institutions that control networks of wealth and support, or what Iraqis refer to as the "deep state." Senior government officials and Shiite politicians say the Sadrist movement has learned some of its political tactics from the armed Lebanese Hezbollah, which has a close relationship with the Sadrist movement. These include ways to avoid splitting Sadrist votes to maximize electoral gains.
Nassir al-Rubaie, head of the Sadrist political body, summarized the movement's resurgence by saying, "These positions exist everywhere. We have people affiliated with the Sadrist movement in all state institutions. They hold large and important positions. They are from a graduated institution." He described it as "a blessing from God."
Hazem al-Araji, a senior Sadrist figure, told Reuters that the movement is stronger than ever since 2003, adding that he is "the strongest entity in Iraq." He characterized al-Sadr as "the wisest, the strongest, and the best."
Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi had previously denied that the Sadrist movement controls major positions in his government, asserting that he is in control. His government did not respond to detailed inquiries for this report. An American official declined to comment on internal Iraqi matters, and Iranian officials did not respond to Reuters' inquiries.
**A Familial Tradition**
One of al-Sadr's strongest assets is his popularity. He stands out in this regard from other Iraqi leaders. His father, Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, led the opposition among the oppressed Shiite majority during the rule of Sunni President Saddam Hussein, and was murdered by the regime in 1999. Muqtada al-Sadr (47 years old) derives his popularity from his father, whom his followers consider a martyr, as well as his prominence as a cleric who has never left Iraq. Other prominent figures in governments that took power after Saddam's fall have traveled to Iran and the West for extended periods before returning after the American invasion of Iraq.
In 2003, al-Sadr stood against the U.S. occupation, leading the Mahdi Army, which included thousands of volunteer fighters against American invaders. The sprawling Sadr City neighborhood in Baghdad is a stronghold for the movement, housing three million residents. Among them is fighter Jaafar Muhammad, 37, who told Reuters he fought the Americans during the early years of the invasion. He added that he sold everything to buy weapons, saying, "I even sold my daughter’s earrings... Taji was gold." Muhammad later participated unarmed in protests that led to the overthrow of the Iranian-backed government in 2019.
Al-Sadr's popularity far exceeds that of Sadr City. In a mosque in the southern city of Basra, graduates looking for work gathered in March, waiting to hear from al-Araji who explained to Reuters that he assists graduates in finding jobs by contacting politicians and Sadrist followers, and even al-Sadr himself at times. Two graduates told Reuters they had spent years trying to get jobs in the energy sector through contact with other political parties. Shihab al-Din Nuri (25 years old) stated, "Yes, I participated in the Basra protests seeking a job. Everyone who promised us good was lying except for the Sadrist movement. I was appointed through the movement on a daily wage in Basra Oil Company, pipeline authority, three months ago... Yes, I will vote for them because they have favored me and they are strong."
**A Key Meeting**
Starting from the middle of the past decade, al-Sadr generally distanced himself from both U.S.-backed and Iranian-backed Iraqi governments. In 2007, the Sadrist movement withdrew from the government due to its refusal to set a timetable for the withdrawal of American forces. In 2008, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki led a crackdown on the Mahdi Army, resulting in hundreds of casualties. In 2014, al-Sadr announced that he would withdraw from the political arena. His associates say he feared his reputation would be compromised by association with a ruling class that almost all Iraqis view as corrupt.
Undoubtedly, the Sadrist movement continued to hold key positions in some ministries, especially the Ministry of Health, and persisted in fielding candidates in elections. However, it was no longer a major force in the Iraqi government.
Al-Sadr's approach began to change in the summer of 2018 during a meeting with several of his top political representatives at his home in Najaf, according to two senior Sadrist officials familiar with the developments. The movement had made its strongest electoral gains and controlled the largest bloc in parliament. Al-Sadr listened to those who wanted to take on senior administrative positions in the state. One official quoted him as saying, "If you can correct the mistakes of previous governments and work to save the country from chaos and fragmentation, then go ahead with God’s blessing. But understand well that I will be a counselor, but if you fail, I disown you."
Al-Sadr declined to give an interview for this report.
**The Source of Power**
In the following months, the Sadrists surprised some observers by stepping back from pursuing high ministerial positions. Instead, they targeted a specific role which would prove crucial for their future dominance over state authority: the position of secretary-general of the Council of Ministers. The person in this role oversees appointments within state institutions.
A deputy who was allied with al-Sadr at that time stated, "The Iranian-backed parties apparently did not understand the importance of this position. They were focusing on ministerial positions. Therefore, they agreed to this arrangement. It turned out to be the most important position the Sadrists secured." A Sadrist official recounted that personal connections tilted the balance, as the Sadrist candidate hailed from the same southern city as then-Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi. He added, "Sometimes, some of these relationships influence decisions."
Hamid al-Ghizi, a Sadrist, took the position and began issuing orders to dismiss the majority of government officials appointed to acting positions. In directives issued in May 2019, al-Ghizi stated that acting officials in state institutions should be replaced with permanent appointments. These new appointments require parliamentary approval, which Sadrists reportedly control according to some Iraqi lawmakers.
The directives targeted positions at the special grade level, including undersecretaries and senior officials in ministries and heads of independent state institutions. Those in these roles play a role in establishing contracts, budget expenditures, and appointments in ministries.
While al-Sadr's political rivals focused on key positions at the top, a senior government official noted that the Sadrists understood that "real power sometimes lies at the bottom." He added, "The Sadrists focus on the institutions that have money and can obtain resources."
Al-Rubaie, head of the Sadrist political body, maintained that governments change based on electoral outcomes, but state institutions remain. He noted, "There is a government and there is a state. The government is a temporary electoral formation lasting four years and it falls apart. It can change in a month. However, the state is a stable and structured institutional construction, and all positions below the minister pertain to state building, which should be honest and efficient, even if it is not the Sadrist movement."
He added, "A minister lasts four years and leaves. An undersecretary will outlast dozens of ministers and continue in their work."
Al-Ghizi declined to give an interview. His office stated that the role of the secretary-general is to manage and support state institutions, and that political appointments are outside the scope of the general secretariat's authority.
**In the Void**
However, some positions remained elusive for the Sadrists. A former minister and deputy involved in discussions indicated that Prime Minister Abdul Mahdi rejected the Sadrist candidate for governor of the Central Bank among several other positions under pressure from Iran-backed factions opposing Sadrist appointments. The former minister stated, "They wanted to control the state-owned marketing oil company, the Central Bank, and senior positions in the Ministry of Interior and various government banks. Abdul Mahdi resisted that." Abdul Mahdi did not comment on this matter.
Yet, it was anticipated that the last obstacles would disappear within months. In late 2019, protests erupted against the Iranian-backed Abdul Mahdi government. Demonstrators condemned corruption and foreign influence, particularly criticizing Iran. Iraqi security forces and Iran-backed factions launched a crackdown on unarmed protesters.
Al-Sadr took to Twitter demanding the government’s resignation. His supporters joined the protests. A democracy-seeking protester named Mustafa Qasim (31) stated, "The presence of the Sadrist movement with us was crucial. They are a major force and provided us with moral and material support."
The Abdul Mahdi government announced it would resign in November 2019. Weeks later, U.S. President Donald Trump ordered a drone strike that killed Iranian Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis at Baghdad Airport. The deaths of the two weakened and fragmented the Iran-aligned bloc.
In this vacuum, al-Sadr advanced. More than ten current and former ministers and Western diplomats noted that he capitalized on the disarray of his opponents and the weakened position of Prime Minister al-Kadhimi to accelerate Sadrist control. Al-Kadhimi has denied that the Sadrist movement makes the decisions. He stated in a television interview in May that the only request al-Sadr made was, "Take care of Iraq." Al-Kadhimi did not elaborate and his office did not respond to Reuters' inquiries.
Beginning in September 2020, al-Ghizi and the Prime Minister’s office gave approval for a series of appointments. The Sadrists took the deputy minister of interior for administrative affairs position, which allows the holder to oversee spending and appointments. A loyalist to al-Sadr became an undersecretary in the Ministry of Communications.
Government officials and lawmakers indicated that in positions not directly occupied by Sadrists, appointments went to their favored candidates, effectively making them beholden to al-Sadr. Among the positions dominated by the Sadrists through allies are those of undersecretary of oil and governor of the Central Bank, along with other sensitive financial matters, according to officials from the ministries of oil and finance. Al-Rubaie, al-Sadr’s assistant, denied that the Sadrists control the Central Bank. Neither Central Bank Governor Mustafa Ghalib nor Oil Undersecretary Karim Hatab responded to Reuters’ inquiries.
A recent report by the Chatham House research center estimated that the Sadrists have held around 200 of the most influential non-ministerial positions since 2018. The increased role of the Sadrist movement in state management has helped push through preferred legislation and approve or veto major government decisions.
The 2021 budget allocates more funds to southern Iraq, the center of Shiite influence that represents the Sadrist movement's traditional support base in the ministries where it has its greatest influence, according to senior Shiite and Kurdish politicians. This could leave less for the Sunni northern regions that suffered devastation in the battle against ISIS and are in desperate need of reconstruction. The Sadrist movement has not commented on this.
Deputies and analysts say the general elections in October and the new electoral law are regarded as beneficial to major parties with broad public support because candidates will need more votes, possibly strengthening the Sadrist position. The Sadrists have called for the elections and the new law.
Two Sadrist officials and three senior Shiite officials noted that the Shiite Hezbollah group provided political training to the Sadrists. For instance, in the 2009 local elections, the Sadrist movement carefully pushed a calculated number of candidates in each area to avoid splitting Sadrist votes.
Al-Sadr's assistant and two other Sadrist officials indicated that the Sadrist movement and Hezbollah remain closely connected, regularly exchanging political, economic, and military expertise, including strategies for dealing with local and regional political crises. The three refrained from providing specifics. The two factions employ a similar approach to local communication, combined with the activities of both military and political wings, and familial connections through marriage tie the two sides together, as al-Sadr's family hails from Lebanon.
A spokesperson for Hezbollah confirmed that the group provided what it described as assistance to Iraqi factions, including the Sadrist movement, stating, "Yes, this is true. We have provided some help, political training, and education to several Iraqi factions, including the Sadrist movement, and of course, training and electoral programs." He added, "Relations are good and productive with many Iraqi political forces, including the Sadrist movement, and our communications with them are ongoing and positively consistent."
**An Unknown Entity**
With the elections set for October, Sadrists are filled with confidence. Hassan al-Kaabi, the first deputy speaker of the Iraqi parliament, stated in a television interview in April, "The next Prime Minister will be a Sadrist, one hundred percent."
Most of al-Sadr's opponents accept that the Sadrists will take the first place and that their exceptional influence in state management will give them the final say over who leads the government.
These predictions present a dilemma for Western and regional powers. Al-Sadr has previously criticized Tehran, Washington, London, and Gulf capitals for interfering in Iraqi affairs. However, he is also one of the few high-ranking Shiite leaders who visited Saudi Arabia, while he has spent significant time in Iran despite his unstable relationship with it.
A senior official in the Sadrist movement revealed, "Muqtada has good relations with the Gulf, Iran, and Turkey," but corrected himself after mentioning the U.S. in the same context. He said, "He has relatives in Qom (the Iranian holy city)," referring to his older brother living in Iran.
A senior official in the autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq, which has close ties to the United States, stated, "I find it difficult to see al-Sadr confronting Iran. Ultimately, Muqtada will be closer to Iran than to the U.S."
A Western diplomat noted that Western countries view al-Sadr as "an unknown," seeing him as the only Iraqi leader capable of implementing reforms and confronting Iranian-backed factions, yet he remains deeply suspicious of the United States and Britain specifically. The diplomat pointed to al-Sadr's religious stance on homosexuality, alcohol consumption, and women's rights, saying, "Concerns regarding human rights will also arise." In March of last year, al-Sadr claimed that the legalization of same-sex marriage in some foreign countries was responsible for the COVID-19 pandemic.
**Turning Away**
The rise of al-Sadr's role carries risks for the Sadrist movement itself. Two senior government officials opposed to al-Sadr stated that his followers have shown no mercy in their pursuit of state positions. An education official in southern Iraq named Abu Amir recounted how al-Sadr's supporters threatened him to resign from his position in a public school, a position from which he had just been ousted due to corruption charges against his Sadrist predecessor. Abu Amir stated that they wanted to reinstate the ousted Sadrist official. He said that once he assumed the position, he began receiving threatening messages from al-Sadr's supporters demanding his resignation. He added that a recently appointed Sadrist official entered the school days later accompanied by armed individuals and reinstated the ousted Sadrist figure. Abu Amir had to flee.
Abu Amir requested not to publish his full name for fear of repercussions. The Sadrist movement did not respond to a request for comment.
On the other hand, some young Sadrists have begun to turn away from the movement. Qasim, who participated in the protests, said he had been a supporter of the movement but stated that he and others have distanced themselves out of frustration after al-Sadr's followers turned against pro-democracy activists in early 2020. Al-Sadr had withdrawn his support for the protests weeks after they succeeded in ousting the Iranian-backed government. Qasim said, "Maybe al-Sadr is gaining influence in the state, but he is losing people like me."
