Twenty-one years have passed since the proposal was made, and fifteen years since his martyrdom. Pierre Gemayel (the grandson), the champion of the saying "If you love Lebanon, love what it produces," wished to protect Lebanon and its people from the impending disasters and proposed, in 2001, a law to establish a monitoring agency for incidents represented by the Disaster Management Authority. The years went by. Pierre was martyred. Many were killed before and after him. Calamities and crises occurred. Lebanon's forests burned repeatedly. Buildings collapsed on their inhabitants. The capital, Lebanon's jewel, Beirut, was bombed, and the rubble became hills, while the proposal to establish the Disaster Management Authority remains as lifeless as a corpse. What about this authority - this project? Is the existing Disaster Management Unit capable of protecting Lebanon and its people from disasters, or do disaster responses come secondary to the private interests of Lebanon's politicians?
Before the blood of the two-year-old girl Joumana, who fell victim to a building collapse in Tripoli a week ago, dried, we knocked on the doors of many who contributed, closely or distantly, to preparing the grounds for the Disaster Management Authority in Lebanon. They appeared angry yet resigned. Most spoke with the condition of anonymity. One pointed us to someone who was a driving force behind the project, who in turn indicated another person still insisting that Lebanon must have an authority to manage disasters. Thus, we began asking them one by one: Why has the proposal to create the Disaster Management Authority in Lebanon not seen the light? Why do projects aimed at protecting the Lebanese, "from long ago until now," not materialize?
### Jurisdiction Conflicts
Let’s start with the idea — three bills were introduced over 21 years to establish the authority that Lebanon desperately needs. The first bill was presented by the martyr Pierre Gemayel. The second was put forward by former MP Mohammad Kabbani. The third bill was submitted by MPs from the Lebanese Forces. All spoke about the importance of establishing this authority.
Let’s go back ten years, to October 18, 2012, when the Public Works, Transport, Energy and Water Committee and the subcommittee under the joint parliamentary committees convened to study Kabbani's proposed law to establish a Disaster Management Authority. On that day, Margaret Wahlström, the former UN Special Representative for Disaster Risk Reduction, was present, as was Michel Moussa. Today we find ourselves in 2022. What happened in ten years? MP Michel Moussa, a member of the Development and Liberation Bloc, responds, "It was a proposal we discussed in committees, but it did not reach its conclusion. We sought, during discussions with local and international organizations, to put a specific structure in place and define jurisdictions to face potential disasters including floods, fires, and earthquakes." The authority did not take the necessary steps for approval, so is there a convincing reason for this, in Moussa's opinion? He replies, "There were differing viewpoints that prevented it, despite the urging from UN institutions." Can we know, more precisely, what the reason was? He answers, "There was disagreement over conflicting jurisdictions and a lack of consensus on the organization. Unfortunately, differences in viewpoints sometimes lead us to hit a brick wall. I hope a disaster does not occur."
### Recovery Forbidden
Michel Moussa made two mistakes in what he told us. First, he said, "differences in viewpoints sometimes," when it would be more accurate for him to say always. Second, he wished for a disaster not to happen in a Lebanon already afloat in disasters. Naturally, we won’t hold him solely accountable for the failure to establish the authority due to fears of jurisdictional conflict and "this is yours and this is mine." This has brought us to the bleak, dark depths in Lebanon where everyone raises their hands as if innocent of everything that has befallen the Lebanese.
Let’s return to those who were deeply involved in drafting the Disaster Response Framework in Lebanon before it transformed into a bill. Despair is evident among all who contributed to this effort. The majority were contracted with the United Nations and gradually moved on to preparing other projects elsewhere as long as Lebanon remains divided over shares and interests, living under constant bickering about “what’s mine and what’s yours,” disregarding the interests of the Lebanese people. What would have changed with the establishment of the Disaster Management Authority in Lebanon, or what later came to be known as Pierre Gemayel's bill?
Insiders speak of significant issues that arose in the Parliament to prevent the project from passing due to conflicts of interest, which would entail the dismantling of various interests and offices that have been established over previous decades and allocated to political forces. Thus, as has happened in every instance, they decided to "resolve the issue" among these forces by creating a limited-mandate Disaster Management Unit instead of a broadly mandated authority.
The insiders, who were instrumental in the project at that time, argue that the political forces treated the matter politically, which hindered execution. “Some rejected from the beginning the idea that the Prime Minister’s office manage disasters, despite the fact that Article 64 of the Constitution states that 'the Prime Minister follows up on the work of public administrations and institutions and coordinates between ministers and provides general guidance.'” In any case, a plan for the creation of the authority was meticulously drafted, according to international standards, but was delayed after a tsunami struck the Pacific in 2005. It is said that General François El-Hajj contributed in 2005, following the bombings and the martyrdom of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, to drafting a rapid security response outline in such disasters, determining the parties and agencies that should be present. May God have mercy on François El-Hajj, who also was martyred in another catastrophic scene, and yet the authority was never born.
### Responsibility for Fires
The authority's project is a general framework that anticipates pre-disaster, during-disaster, and post-disaster phases to ensure effective disaster management. All ministries and institutions in Lebanon are supposed to participate in this, even the Ministry of Labor, which has a role in the event of a disaster requiring the evacuation of foreign workers, thus it should be involved. All scenarios are included in the plan. Each ministry had its role defined. They were linked together in a coordination room at the Grand Serail. Ports, airports, the Council for Scientific Research, the army, internal security, the Red Cross, civil defense, the Higher Relief Commission—all have roles during disasters, with one ministry’s duty ending as another begins. If the authority had been ratified, everything would have functioned with the push of a button. In other words, it could have likely absorbed the consequences of the port explosions more effectively.
Continuing with the authors of the plan: "It was decided that the authority would be under the supervision of the Prime Minister, who would issue orders to act, allowing each entity, in prior coordination, to fulfill its role. The approval of the authority’s plan was essential not only to face natural disasters but also the current catastrophic crises. It detailed scenarios for crises like flour shortages and bread loss, as well as for the loss of medicine, water, and electricity, and food security plans. If approved, it could have established a vision for crises and made timely decisions, approving security plans and security cordons during moments of security disasters. For instance, during the port explosion, all institutions were supposed to participate in the response, but in the absence of an approved authority, the cabinet entrusted the military institution alone with the task. It did what it could, but simultaneously, all private associations descended haphazardly on the ground because the army couldn’t perform the role of all institutions. While corpses lay in pools of their blood, thieves, who claimed they were helping, stole jewelry, furniture, and anything else they could find. This is the absence of coordination that resulted from the lack of the Disaster Management Authority."
### No State, Nothing
We live in a state devoid of structure. No matter how active the associations are, they cannot absorb the repercussions of the crises. Here, one of those who participated in drafting the plan notes: In 2010, we spoke with President Saad Hariri about the importance of this authority, and he literally told us: "Go ahead," precisely after the disaster of the building collapse in Sioufi. Mohammad Kabbani reintroduced the project, nearly ten years after Pierre Gemayel's original proposal. However, it once again faced political obstacles.
### "Unit" vs. "Authority"
Currently, there is a Disaster Management Unit in Lebanon. How does it differ from the long-desired Disaster Management Authority? One activist in the field says: "The unit's role currently is to handle natural disasters and human-made ones, but not to deal with the causes of security aggression. We respond to fires, storms, and floods. We have operation rooms in the Grand Serail and rooms in various governorates. In the recent building collapse in Tripoli, operations were assigned to the northern operations room. However, if wildfires occur that require national efforts, the government operations room will become active."
According to those working within the unit, the name of the entity managing disasters—be it authority, federation, unit, association, or directorate—is irrelevant. What matters is that it be capable of managing disasters, which the existing unit cannot do; it is not empowered, according to its founding document, to address the current medicine crisis, for example. If the authority existed today, those responsible for patient deaths due to the unavailability of medication could be held accountable. In any case, when it comes to disaster management, it revolves around four elements: preparedness, readiness, response, and recovery. In response, deficiencies and weaknesses should be evaluated. In recovery, Lebanon is exceedingly weak, with the port disaster serving as a prime example, where not only should damages have been evaluated, and compensations provided for the affected, but also reconstruction should have occurred in a better manner to avoid facing the disaster again. None of this occurred for two reasons: the sheer number of crises and disasters in Lebanon, and each institution’s belief that its role, if willing, is comprehensive. This cannot be according to the Disaster Management Authority’s plan, as each institution has an exclusive responsibility it must follow through to the end and be held accountable for. Unfortunately, work in Lebanon is dominated by chaos and a lack of accountability.
Twenty-one years have passed since the project for the establishment of the Crisis Management Authority began. We continue to live through crises en masse, with a response of zero. Why? Because there are “leaders” in the country who want to remain seated atop entities and councils that behave as if they are the mother of the child within them. In every instance of crisis, they excuse themselves by claiming they sent a letter about it to another authority in the country. Thus, there is no security, no accountability, no response, and no recovery.
