Lebanon's absence from the expanded Arab-American summit hosted by Saudi Arabia in Jeddah did not prevent its significant presence in the final statement issued at the summit as well as in the Saudi-American summit statement. Both statements redrew the roadmap to be followed to overcome the crisis besieging Lebanon, conditioned on successfully advancing negotiations with the International Monetary Fund.
The statements from these two summits regarding Lebanon did not carry anything new, except for the reaffirmation of the need to respect the constitution by electing a new president within the constitutional deadline, that is, before the end of the current president Michel Aoun's term on October 31. The contents of the statements were merely a replica of the one issued at the Saudi-French summit during French President Emmanuel Macron's visit to the Kingdom and the one that came from the Gulf Cooperation Council meeting, which capped the tour conducted by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to member states.
Furthermore, the Kuwaiti initiative brought by Foreign Minister Ahmad Nasser Al-Mohammad Al-Sabah to Beirut was also a duplicate of the statement from the Gulf summit, supported by Arab and international efforts to halt the deterioration of Lebanese-Arab relations, especially with the Gulf, after they reached a peak of crisis.
However, the new aspect in the statements from the Saudi-American and Arab-American summits pertains to the completion of the presidential election process on time, considering U.S. President Joe Biden's insistence on returning to play a role in the region. This is crucial because a vacuum would allow Russia, China, and Iran to fill the void resulting from the absence of the U.S., which Biden acknowledged in his press conference immediately after the Saudi-American summit.
This time, the Lebanese presidential election coincides with Washington’s return to play a role in the region after it had entrusted Paris with the task of monitoring the Lebanese crisis with American accompaniment. This undoubtedly means, from the observers' perspective, that the presidential election holds international attention and will not result solely from Lebanese decisions without being open to international and regional intersections. In other words, there is no way to "Lebanize" the presidential election away from these intersections, as the resistance axis led by Iran will not have the upper hand in electing the upcoming president, although the two summits hosted by the Kingdom left the door open for Tehran to reconsider its calculations and positions to join the global system aimed at restoring stability to the region. The election of a new president is to be a first test of Iranian intentions to cease its interference in the internal affairs of neighboring countries and not to use its security and military arms to destabilize them.
Thus, the presidential election takes precedence over government formation for the time being, unless a last-minute surprise occurs that leads to a breakthrough in accelerating its establishment. This depends on President Michel Aoun's initiative to invite the designated Prime Minister Najib Mikati to resume consultations for forming the government without preconditions.
Although the presidential movement is still tentative, currently limited to the specifications set by Maronite Patriarch Bechara Al-Rahi as a basis for electing the president, along with the breakthrough made by the leader of the Lebanese Forces party, Samir Geagea, in supporting the nomination of Army Commander Joseph Aoun if it turns out that he has advanced chances of reaching the presidency, stagnation still prevails as each team appears to wait for the other to take action.
It can be said that the division within the parliamentary blocs that characterized the session to elect Nabih Berri as president of the parliament for a seventh term and Elias Bou Saab as his deputy cannot simply transfer to electing a new president. This is because the parliament is now poised to reshuffle its cards, and it would be inappropriate to preempt what these blocs will decide. Although the leader of the Marada Movement, former MP Sleiman Frangieh, currently leads the race for the presidency, this annoys his adversary, Gibran Bassil, head of the Free Patriotic Movement, even though he is already aware that the presidential file remains in the hands of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in consultation with Speaker Berri. Bassil is attempting to broker a deal with Frangieh in exchange for his support, but the latter is not inclined to be dragged into it, as he understands that the negative repercussions would reflect on him and deter hesitant individuals from deciding to elect him as president; yet he allows Hezbollah, should it make its final decision on his nomination, to take action with its ally Bassil to soften his stance.
Consequently, ambiguity still shrouds the presidential movement, and the competitive arena will not be left to Frangieh or another candidate affiliated with the March 8 or resistance axis, even though the Marada leader, who has ties with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the Shiite duo, avoids presenting himself as a candidate attached to the Iran-led axis and is trying to open up to some opposition factions to align with the specifications set by Al-Rahi, which presumably should not apply to candidates affiliated with the March 8 and March 14 forces previously, but rather come to fit a centrist candidate.
Thus, the division within the parliament does not revolve around two camps, but one must consider the stance of the deputies, whether they belong to the change forces or independents. Though Berri's readiness to invite deputies to hold a session to elect a new president in the first half of September—just about two weeks, maybe more, before the constitutional deadline for electing him—does not obscure a series of questions including:
- Is the path clear for electing a president who presents a challenge to both traditional and changeable opposition forces? And who guarantees securing a quorum of two-thirds of the parliamentary members for the session to elect the president in the first electoral round?
- If it proves impossible to elect him in the first round, who guarantees securing the two-thirds quorum to elect the president in the second electoral round with 65 deputies, that is, half the number of parliamentary members plus one?
- The same question applies to the third electoral round, and the answer will be the same: paralysis in holding the session; because both the majority and the opposition would equalize in obstructing each round, opening the door to searching for a centrist candidate to prevent a vacancy in the presidency as the constitutional deadline for electing Aoun's successor expires.
In this context, some affirm that international and regional convergence regarding the presidential file favors consensus on electing a centrist president who does not belong to either of the two conflicting camps, while being in contact with both and positioning himself mid-way between them. However, those betting on the "Lebanization" of the presidential election will discover that their wager is misplaced, as international interest does not merely observe but will have a significant role in electing a president with the specifications necessary for reintegrating Lebanon into the international focus on resuming the necessary assistance to transition from crisis to alleviation, starting with liberating the republic from captivity as a condition for reviving the state project.
