The ruling parties are generating positive atmospheres regarding the formation of a government that is supposed to be finalized before the end of President Michel Aoun's term. The second government of President Najib Mikati during this mandate is expected to be born three months after the assignment, with the new government being a near replica of its predecessor, featuring slight changes and amendments to preserve Aoun's and Mikati's dignity.
If these atmospheres are accurate, accompanied by other external pressures leaning in the same direction, it does not mean that the upcoming phase will be governed by positivity. Many political parties consider that failing to form a government is better than the anticipated one, as it exerts pressure on political factions to complete the presidential election process within the constitutional timeframe due to the issue of a caretaker government assuming presidential powers, especially amidst a growing crisis on all fronts. Conversely, the establishment of a new government without any "ambiguities" regarding its ability to assume presidential powers in the event of a presidential vacancy would assist those intending to delay the election of a new president, reassuring them of the possibility of procrastination and delay, hoping that time would play to their advantage regarding the presidency.
The team currently in power and head of the "Free Patriotic Movement" and MP Gebran Bassil may be the primary beneficiaries of the formation of a new government and the delay in electing a new president. With the arrival of midnight on October 31, all control elements will fall from Aoun and Bassil's hands, as constitutionally, Aoun has no choice but to leave the presidential palace; he does not have the right to remain in the palace, revoke Mikati's mandate, or assign another figure to lead. He also lacks support or backing from any internal or external parties to take the country into constitutional chaos. Thus, it is in the interest of both men to form a government that preserves their "significant" share in the caretaker government, especially since this government could resolve essential issues during a presidential vacancy, from maritime demarcation to agreements with the International Monetary Fund, alongside appointments that Bassil could gain from, backed by his ally "Hezbollah."
Therefore, "Hezbollah" is applying its political weight to achieve the governmental entitlement and lends Bassil this card before the end of the term, within the limits that the "party" can reach. Political sources believe that "the party" is not the "glorifier" as portrayed, and regarding the governmental issue, it is not Hezbollah's Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah who forms the government, but rather Mikati, supported by Berri. Together, they thwarted the formation of a thirty-minister government that includes six political state ministers, which Aoun and Bassil hoped for, as "the party" cannot position itself against Berri, its strategic ally within the Shiite environment, who does not want to give Aoun a governmental card at the end of his term.
Consequently, "Hezbollah" is pressuring to form a government "out of respect" for Aoun. If the term were not seeking a government and pressing for its formation, "Hezbollah" would prefer to keep the current caretaker government and be satisfied with it. However, it responds to the pressures from the term, not wanting to lose its Christian ally on one hand, nor to push the country into constitutional chaos on the other, which it would personally bear the consequences of. However, there is a maximum limit that "the party" can reach on the governmental level, which is to reconstitute the current government with some additions; it cannot compel Mikati to sign a government that does not suit him due to internal Sunni considerations, external Saudi factors, and alliances with Berri. Thus, this is its capability, and it seeks to do everything to satisfy the term, but this is the ceiling it can achieve.
From this perspective, sources from the resistance axis believe that if the caretaker government is replicated, it does not count as a concession from Aoun, given that adding six political ministers to it within a month is challenging, as it is difficult to satisfy all political spectrums. Additionally, Aoun raised the bar to at least maintain the caretaker government with "a little charm." Furthermore, Aoun will not end his term with a major "troll," but rather, he is deceiving both allies and opponents into believing that he has relinquished his governmental demands, ensuring "the party" stands by Bassil in the new presidential term, to enhance its stature and demands, be they governmental or other aspirations for power.
