The organizations present in Syria can be classified as either affiliated with the Brotherhood, jihadist Salafism, or more extreme groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS. This diversity has led to ongoing confrontations since the beginning of the events in Syria. The first category is represented by the "Ahrar al-Sham" movement, which combines Salafi and Brotherhood elements. There is always a conflict between them over leadership and policy, reflected in the movement’s Shura Council, representing the struggle between two factions; a "Salafi jihadist" conservative faction close to Al-Qaeda, and a faction close to the Muslim Brotherhood. This conflict is mirrored in the movement's members, who frequently shift allegiances. For example, Ali al-Amar, known as “Abu Ammar,” was appointed as the general leader of "Ahrar al-Sham." He is an engineer from a Syrian "Brotherhood" family that fled to Iraq in the 1980s, then moved to Yemen, where he joined Al-Qaeda, returning to Syria as part of the "moderate" trend within "Ahrar al-Sham."
The second category is represented by the "Liwa al-Quds" movement, which is close to Al-Qaeda and has allied at times with "Fatah al-Sham" before it became "Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham," and at times with "Ahrar al-Sham," and has occasionally approached ISIS. The group split from "al-Jolani" in rejection of fighting ISIS, and is accused of being close to ISIS and involved in assassination operations against Syrian opposition leaders, having left the "Jaish al-Fatah" at the end of 2015 due to the latter's announced fight against them.
Next to "Liwa al-Quds" is the organization "Hurras al-Din," representing Al-Qaeda in Syria, alongside many other groups such as "Nour al-Din al-Zenki," "Ajnad al-Sham," "Liwa al-Haq," "Turkistani Islamic Party," and "Ansar al-Din." Meanwhile, "Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham" stands in the middle as an umbrella organization for groups close to it in ideology, both Salafi and Brotherhood elements, and members of Al-Qaeda who have either been assassinated or subdued. It continues its pragmatic approach, maintaining a balance between both factions on its right and left.
ISIS stands as a third category opposing all other factions but sometimes operates from areas controlled by other groups, especially in border regions controlled by "Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham," which is now facing strong opposition from Brotherhood-affiliated groups and Salafi jihadist references, as well as from citizens who accuse it of betrayal and corruption.
"Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham" (HTS) is experiencing a struggle between two currents; the first includes blocks from the eastern region, led by the legal figure Muthar al-Wais, while the second consists of first-level leaders, including Abu Ahmad Hudud, and the head of the Shura Council, Abdul Rahim Atoon (Abu Abdullah al-Shami). The organization suffers from internal infiltration, which led its leader to detain his aides on charges of operating a spying network comprising dozens of leaders and cadres working for "foreign countries," in addition to attempts to overthrow the leadership. Among those detained are Muthar al-Wais, a member of the judiciary and Shura Council, Zaid al-Attar, the political bureau chief, Abu Mahjan al-Hasakawi, the region's representative in Idlib, the former legal figure in the organization, and Talha al-Maysar known as "Abu Shu’aib al-Masri."
Thus, we are not facing a single entity in Syria but rather multiple components, with internal discord prevailing over unity. Facts have proven that a "consensus" cannot occur when exclusion serves as a weapon among them constantly. Turkey, alongside other international external parties, has tried to re-organize these Syrian factions and categorized them into hawks and doves, conservatives and reformists, radicals and moderates. However, it has thus far failed due to jihadist Salafi references, mergers, reliance on external powers, and fierce competition for control.
It is often surprising that some states classify these factions only to later reclassify them in opposing ways, such as "Jaish al-Islam," "Jaish al-Mujahideen," "Thuwar al-Sham," "Saqour al-Sham," "Tajammu Fastaqim Kama Umirta," "Nour al-Din al-Zenki," "Aswad al-Sharqi," "Faylaq al-Rahman," "Jabhat al-Shamiya," and "Free Idlib Army," as well as "Ahrar al-Sham," which Russia and the U.S. have classified as terrorist organizations and have since reclassified multiple times, both by them and Turkey, since the Astana Conference until now.
Turkey is now seeking to restore relations with the Syrian regime while having control over "Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham," which harbors dozens of factions. It is also hinting at the desire to eliminate "radicals," a direction that the upcoming regional approach is taking. But will these efforts succeed? Will the attempts to rid of the radicals be successful? Will these organizations accept the new regional policy? Where will the moderates fit into the Syrian regime equation? How will all these elements be integrated? These are questions that upcoming days will answer.