The nuclear materials remaining in Syria are raising serious security concerns due to conflicting information about their fate and whether they will be moved out of the country or remain under Syrian government control with oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
According to Dr. Zoe Levrinick's report at the 'Alma' Center, reports on August 10 suggested that the United States reached understandings with Syria and Israel to have the IAEA oversee the removal of nuclear materials from a site known as 'Site 99' in Syria.
The report highlighted that the site contains remnants of Assad's secret nuclear program, including 'yellowcake' made from uranium. Israel has been monitoring the site and stated it would not tolerate these materials remaining there.
However, on August 18, Syria and the IAEA issued a joint statement that presented a different, perhaps contradictory image, asserting that the nuclear materials declared by Damascus would remain under Syrian control and placed under international safeguards. IAEA inspectors visited the Deir ez-Zor site and another site not announced by Syria until July 2026.
It remains unclear if the reports refer to the same site and materials. It is possible that materials from 'Site 99' are still set for removal while another quantity remains in Syria, with prior understandings potentially amended. No public explanation for this discrepancy has been issued, necessitating official clarification.
Reports associate these materials with Assad's 'Al Kibar' nuclear program, centered around a secret nuclear reactor built in Deir ez-Zor with North Korean assistance, resembling the Yongbyon reactor in North Korea used for plutonium production for Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program.
The Syrian reactor was meant to produce plutonium for potential nuclear weapons before Israel destroyed it in September 2007, shortly before it became operational. After the raid, Assad's regime demolished the facility remains, concealed information, and restricted the IAEA inspectors' access to related sites and personnel for years.
'Yellowcake' is a concentrated powder of uranium compounds resulting from the initial processing of uranium ore. Though not enriched or usable on its own for nuclear weaponry, it is a precursor in uranium processing and enrichment cycles.
As reported by Axios, the materials at 'Site 99' cannot directly produce a nuclear bomb but could potentially be used, among other possibilities, as radioactive material in a 'dirty bomb.'
Storage of 'yellowcake' does not require a highly fortified reactor or facility, typically kept as a dry powder inside sealed metal barrels within a secure building. Although the external radiation risk is relatively low, the spread, inhalation, or ingestion of the powder poses radiological and chemical hazards, necessitating strict access controls, inventory management, and constant monitoring.
The report views the Assad regime's readiness to cooperate with the IAEA as a positive development, but the threat remains. The IAEA can verify declared materials, inspect permitted sites, and install surveillance systems but lacks enforcement capability to protect sites independently, prevent theft, or secured material transport.
The primary responsibility for securing materials lies with the Syrian government. This presents a major vulnerability.
Syria's ongoing instability and lack of full, consistent control over all its territory allow ISIS cells to exploit security gaps, while the Shiite axis maintains its foothold in the country. New military and security apparatuses are under construction, with some leaders having extremist, ideological jihadist backgrounds.
In these contexts, attempts by hostile elements like ISIS cells or Iran-affiliated networks or criminal organizations to access material parts cannot be ruled out. The report also speculates about internal 'rebellions' against Assad by Syrian security factions opposing policies, seizing nuclear materials to pressurize the regime and the international community.
The risk does not center on Syria's immediate ability to produce a nuclear weapon but rather on the potential theft, smuggling, sale, or use of radioactive materials for blackmail or terrorism.
Moreover, threats could arise not only from theft or foreign organizations seizing materials but also from shifts in Syrian regime behavior. The Assad government currently collaborates with the IAEA and seeks international legitimacy with no evidence of intent to misuse materials.
Nevertheless, the materials' Syrian presence might transition from merely a security issue to nuclear proliferation alarm if Assad’s regime becomes more hardline, as extremist elements amplify influence within, or international relations degrade.
Such scenarios may lead Damascus to restrict inspectors' access, conceal part of the stockpile, transfer it to others, or use it as political and security leverage. The 'Al Kibar' program's history shows that a regime under international scrutiny can still clandestinely develop a nuclear program over extended periods.
The critical question concerns whether Syria has genuinely disclosed all sites and stockpiles. An IAEA report in September 2025 detected processed natural uranium particles in samples from one of three sites. Syrian authorities have not explained their origin.
Recently, materials were found at another site previously undisclosed, indicating that more data and materials continue to emerge, suggesting the Syrian nuclear program's full picture remains incomplete.
While IAEA oversight is vital, it is insufficient alone. Comprehensive site and stockpile surveys, access to former nuclear program members, reliable field security, continuous surveillance, and transparency regarding foreign states' roles are crucial. Until the full picture is apparent, Israel cannot rely solely on Damascus statements or international monitoring but will continue independently tracking materials, sites, and actors vying for access with its intelligence capabilities.