Political sources in contact with figures from both the ruling coalition and scattered opposition factions are concerned that President Michel Aoun might limit himself to maintaining the democratic facade by calling on parliamentary blocs and independent MPs to participate in mandatory consultations for naming the prime minister tasked with forming the new government, without contributing to its formation. This is contingent on whether the cabinet lineup aligns with the desires of the president of the "Free National Movement," MP Gebran Bassil, and fulfills his ambitions to secure Aoun's political legacy immediately after the end of his presidential term on October 31, especially after Bassil's chances of succeeding him in the presidency have diminished.
These political sources tell "Asharq Al-Awsat" that their concerns are valid since most political forces have previously endured significant difficulties from Bassil's attempts to obstruct government formations in coordination with President Aoun. These attempts were only resolved when it became clear that the cabinet lineup would safeguard Bassil's interests, which he could later use to obstruct cabinet sessions unless their decisions met his conditions, benefiting from the consideration shown to him by his ally, "Hezbollah".
They point out that it is premature to discuss names for the potential prime minister, although the name of former Prime Minister Najib Mikati tops the list before undergoing a serious test of Aoun's intentions and whether he wishes to conclude the remainder of his term by facilitating the government's formation to ensure ongoing negotiations with the International Monetary Fund for assistance, aimed at halting the economic and financial downturn that has reached its peak.
The same sources confirm that Mikati is apprehensive about the situation and was not comfortable with the political scene resulting from the first session of the newly elected parliamentary council, which was dedicated to electing the speaker of parliament, his deputy, and the bureau. This session led to an unprecedented sharp division dominated by unjustified political fervor.
They warn of the risk of some, specifically those in contact with Bassil, enticing offers for prime minister candidates in an attempt to create a competition for Mikati that does not actually exist. Although he does not shy away from taking on responsibility, he is not inclined to form a government at any cost that aligns with the conditions of the political team associated with Aoun or meets Bassil's ambitions as a consolation prize for his exit from the presidential race.
They argue that those advising Aoun to adhere to the principles of the democratic game by opening the door to choosing a parliamentary figure for the premiership under the pretext of respecting what the mandatory consultations will bring do not seek to facilitate government formation but rather to create obstacles that hinder its birth. Consequently, it seems that their advice is well-intentioned but ultimately harmful.
The sources attribute this concern to the first parliamentary session, which indicates that the vast majority of Sunni MPs were in a state of confusion, with little significant participation due to the absence of a weighty parliamentary bloc and a lack of a regulator capable of intervening. This is not only to assert their existence but also to maintain the lost balance of one of Lebanon's major sects.
They add that the presence of the Club of Former Prime Ministers was missing from the session and is likely to remain absent unless it plays an active role in the political equation following its members' reluctance to contest the elections. They emphasize the need to enhance their role, despite differences of opinion, in supporting Mikati's candidacy for the future premiership to preserve balance from outside parliament.
The same sources assert that the division within parliament does not suggest that the MPs have the ability to produce solutions in collaboration with a new prime minister who may face difficulties in achieving the desired balance between him and President Michel Aoun and Speaker Nabih Berri. This is not due to a lack of experience but rather the absence of a strong parliamentary bloc to prevent compromising the principle of partnership.
They warn against some attempting to turn the premiership into a testing ground, which could open the door to a struggle over the division of power between the first and second presidencies, while leaving the third presidency as an observer of the surrounding events due to the fragmentation of Sunni MPs, which weakens their sect’s position in the political structure.
The sources also assert that parliament has no option but to favor Mikati’s return to ensure continuity in negotiations with the IMF instead of reverting to square one with another president. Moreover, time does not permit delaying the birth of a government, as the cost would be high, and the state lacks the necessary reserves to prevent a complete collapse and to rebuild relationships with the international community while continuing efforts to re-establish connections with Arab countries, particularly after the current government managed to mend the rift affecting Lebanon's relations with Gulf states.
Mikati’s post-election context is very different; he will not harmoniously align with Aoun without reciprocal efforts to activate the government, as he is not inclined to head a government that is an exact replica of the caretaker government, which has burdened him and the country. This caretaker government consisted of ministers distracted by traps instead of addressing the concerns of the Lebanese people and ensuring even the basic necessities for livelihood.
Therefore, betting on Mikati's return to the premiership will not make the path easier for him to form a different kind of government with the support of a parliamentary majority. Rather, it will depend on President Aoun's willingness to cooperate without preconditions meant to restore Bassil's image within the cabinet, especially since he urgently needs Aoun not to squander the last cartridge for the last government of the "Strong Era," which should not resemble its predecessors where Bassil held the reins of influence, facilitated by Aoun, who turned a blind eye to the accusations targeting him regarding appointing his son-in-law as a shadow president.
Consequently, resorting to another option of reviving the caretaker government is a constitutional aberration that reflects an attempt to escape forward and will encounter internal resistance and external rejection, starting with Mikati, who is not interested in entering a venture he does not want, as it would amplify the political costs he would incur without benefit and could force him to bear more responsibility than he currently does at the head of the caretaker government. Moreover, it would escalate popular protests.
The ball is now in Aoun's court to facilitate the formation of a government of a different caliber from previous administrations, politically supported and professionally independent, allowing them the freedom to seize the last opportunity to save the country. This requires appointing ministers, mostly from a different caliber than some of the current ministers; otherwise, there is no escape from extending the caretaker government. Consequently, there is nothing preventing its head from calling for cabinet meetings to manage citizens' affairs, even if he reaffirms the designate's name without being given the chance to form a new government unless the majority of MPs have another opinion regarding who will lead its formation.
