In light of the case of Bishop Mousa Al-Haj, questions arise about the path that leads Bkerke to direct its internal and external messages to the Vatican, France, and to the political interior and church leaders in an attempt to take charge of the leadership of Bkerke and the presidency. About two weeks ago, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian visited the Vatican, where he met with Cardinal Pietro Parolin, the Secretary of State, in the presence of Richard Gallagher, the Secretary for Relations with States (akin to a foreign minister). This meeting, which was overlooked by Christian political forces preoccupied with the tourism season, discussed the situation in Lebanon, and Abdollahian later pointed out that his country had "played a significant role in protecting Christians in Iraq and Syria from the criminal ISIS terrorists, thanks to the efforts of the martyr General Qassem Soleimani, and this matter was appreciated by the Vatican," according to the Iranian Foreign Ministry.
The meeting united two figures from the Holy See, each with their perspective on the situation in Lebanon and the region. Gallagher had clearly expressed, during his visit to Lebanon last February, his stance on dialogue with Hezbollah and openness towards it. In contrast, Parolin, who is of higher rank, adopts a different policy — albeit diplomatically — opposing France's influences in the Vatican and its attempts to impose a rhythm different from the traditional policy of the Holy See towards Lebanon and the Christians of the region. Parolin seeks to restore the traditional Lebanese momentum in Vatican circles that have tried for some time to impose a new roadmap for dealing with the Maronite Church of Lebanon and its Christians, amidst complaints and objections that have been frequently raised against them without any counter-campaign to contain Gallagher's movements. Parolin is known for his support of the coexistence in Lebanon and the Taif Agreement, aligning himself closer to the line of Patriarch Mar Nasrallah Pierre Sfeir. However, no one from within has met him in this pursuit.
At a sensitive stage as papal nuncio Monsignor Joseph Spiteri, known for his keen insight into internal developments and their serious ramifications, prepares to leave for Mexico after finishing his mission in Beirut, one can notice a series of signals regarding the absence of a Vatican position on recent developments, including the movements of Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Mar Beshara Boutros Al-Rahi. This raises a number of questions about what is happening in the hallways of Bkerke against the backdrop of issues of greater importance than the case of Bishop Al-Haj, despite its central significance.
Since Gallagher's visit, Bkerke and the Christian forces have lived in a state of denial. Once Al-Rahi launched his initiative regarding neutrality and the international conference but hit a dead end, it seemed that a stagnation surrounded his movement, knowing well that the Vatican does not agree with him on this initiative, and no one from Bkerke or its surroundings has managed to break through the Vatican's stagnation concerning the internal situation and its relationship with Hezbollah. The case of Al-Haj provided the Maronite Patriarch an opportunity to regain control of affairs and initiative within Bkerke and beyond and to direct his internal and external messages, though the central question remains: how can he translate his position into a more present stage, and to what extent can he succeed in re-attracting focus around him while many await him at several crossroads?
It is well known that Al-Rahi's positions upon his election did not resonate positively with most Christian forces of March 14, but rather he was criticized for his alignment with Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement. Ecclesiastically, he surrounded himself with a group of bishops — some of whom he appointed as bishops and others who were bishops but were given senior positions — closer to the March 8 line, and this is not a secret. Gradually, his stance evolved against the presidency and Hezbollah, while at the same time aspirations for his succession increased, with awareness that reports had been sent to the Vatican, and known bishops were preparing for his succession. This development in the situation in Bkerke and outside coincided with a change in the Vatican's perspective on the Maronite Church and its role due to the influences from known political circles.
Therefore, what Al-Rahi has done cannot be isolated from an internal course through which he is directing a series of messages. At the first moment of the permanent assembly of bishops, it appeared that the atmosphere among some participants favored reaching a settlement. However, the paradox that informed observers note is that Al-Rahi seemed resolute and unwilling to back down from his escalatory stance, and merely borrowing the position of his late predecessor Patriarch Sfeir means he is taking a significant political step, even though some criticized him for limiting the case to that of Judge Fadi Akiki alone. While discussions revolve around a potential settlement being prepared away from the pressing atmosphere, Al-Rahi remained insistent on fighting the battle from a political angle, not just a judicial one.
Al-Rahi wants to send his messages to some of those around him and certain bishops whom he well knows their roles. Notably, a church and monastic atmosphere, particularly among the monasteries that support the presidency, was not prominently present, either in movements or in condemnation or in supporting Bishop Al-Haj. He seeks to dominate the church atmosphere and to have the final word as Patriarch, whether concerning church files or political issues. Here, the presidential file becomes one of the files that he wants Bkerke to spearhead. He still clings to the role he played in bringing together the four Maronite leaders and defining the specifications of a strong president. In his newly defined role, after finally specifying the traits of the president, he attempts to benefit from the lost Christian and Maronite time to advance presidentially. He sends a message to the Vatican and France, which tries to influence the Holy See in the presidential file or in creating supplementary roles within, that he is present, and strongly so, after an effort to marginalize him.
And because there are discussions about an open door for settlements in the presidential arena, he tries to maintain his position, much like the previous position of Bkerke, especially with talk of possibilities of Saudi-Iranian dialogue. His role thus becomes more advanced alongside the Christian forces. However, once again, how can these forces relinquish their role at a time when corners are beginning to round? Contrary to popular belief, even with the heightened rhetoric, these forces — despite the high tone — have kept their movements calculated in directing solidarity toward Bkerke, and anyone who knows how to formulate these movements understands that what happened was meticulously planned, including the choice of the battle's title. While Al-Rahi tries to secure his place in the presidential scene, political forces act on the basis of "what is Caesar's is for Caesar, and what is God's is for God." If the door for settlements is open, then the political forces have their role in the costs of those settlements. If confrontation is inevitable, then these forces are the ones to take center stage and impose their conditions. Meanwhile, Al-Rahi wants to flip the narrative, making Bkerke the forefront of the scene today and the final word belonging to it, raising questions about the possibility of his success amidst the multitude of upcoming deadlines surrounding him and the presidency.
