The pace of institutional collapse in Lebanon is accelerating, rendering them incapable of managing the crises that have plagued the country for three years. The deadly vacuum is not limited to the presidency, the government, or the parliament, which is paralyzed by its inability to pass laws and has become an electoral body while the vacancy in the Baabda Palace persists. Even more concerning is that the vacuum now threatens sensitive state positions that are in daily contact with people's interests, topped by the Central Bank Governor's position, which will be vacant on August 1, when Riad Salameh's term ends, followed by the Director General of General Security, as Major General Abbas Ibrahim will retire in a month and a half, in addition to several other general directors who will leave their posts in the coming months.
The fears among Lebanese citizens are growing that the vacuum will extend into next year, also impacting the leadership of the Lebanese Army with the retirement of General Joseph Aoun, as well as the Internal Security Forces and the Public Prosecution with the upcoming retirements of Major General Imad Osman and Judge Ghassan Oueidat. This will surely heighten political confrontation among the current power components if the caretaker government attempts to address these imminent appointments, either by appointing replacements for those who will retire or extending their terms.
Former Minister Nicolas Nahas, advisor to Prime Minister Najib Mikati, insists that “the presidential vacuum will not extend to the Cabinet, and the Prime Minister will fulfill his duties by making appointments within the narrow limits of caretaker responsibilities.” The key positions in the Lebanese state are spread across 179 first-category positions or their equivalents, and dozens of them will become vacant this year, added to positions that became vacated in the second half of last year, with the political authority unable to fill them due to its failure to form a new government after the parliamentary elections in mid-May.
Researcher Mohammed Shamseddine from “International Information” points out that “73 public positions will become vacant this year, which will negatively impact the performance of those institutions.” He listed the most prominent positions that will see their occupants retire, starting with General Ibrahim on March 2 of the coming year, followed by the Director of Operations in the Lebanese Army, Brigadier General Malik Shams, after him Salameh in early August, and then the Commander of the Gendarmerie Unit in the Internal Security Forces, Brigadier General Marwan Sleilati in October.
Shamseddine notes that “the inability to elect a president this year will exacerbate the crisis further and push towards a broader vacuum,” as next year (2024) will witness the retirement of General Joseph Aoun, General Osman, the Public Prosecutor Judge Ghassan Oueidat, and other general directors in various ministries and departments. The hemorrhage occurring in state institutions did not start with the end of President Michel Aoun's term but was rooted in political disputes between him and Mikati, as they failed to form a government following the elections. This conflict opened the doors for key positions to be vacated, such as the Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Army after the retirement of Major General Amin Al-Aram, the membership in the Military Council held by Brigadier General Milad Issaq, and the Director General of the Ministry of Youth and Sports after the previous director Zaid Khayami retired, as well as the General Directorate of the Ministry of Social Affairs and the presidency of the Judicial Inspection Authority.
The anxiety over reaching a scenario of total vacuum in Lebanon's financial, military, judicial, and administrative institutions, leading to a grim stage signaling the disintegration of these institutions, does not befall Mikati, who, according to close sources, “will not surrender to a reality that is leading the country to complete destruction and is determined to confront such a scenario based on the Cabinet's obligations to convene and make necessary appointments.”
Nahas highlights that “Article 62 of the Constitution is clear; it states that when the presidency becomes vacant, the powers of the president are transferred to the Cabinet. Moreover, Article 64 states that ‘the government exercises its powers in a narrow framework,’ and when a sensitive position is vacated, appointing someone to fill it becomes part of that ‘narrow framework,’ and it becomes imperative for the Cabinet to meet and exercise its powers.” Nahas affirmed in a statement to “Asharq Al-Awsat” that “the Prime Minister is obligated to apply the Constitution and summon the Cabinet to convene, otherwise, he will be subject to accountability and trial if he does not exercise these powers.” He stated: “Certainly, Prime Minister Mikati will not remain idle when any sensitive position becomes vacant, but will promptly set an agenda and inform the ministers about it; anyone who does not participate bears responsibility, and we are not forcing anyone to participate.”
If the previous Cabinet meeting was dedicated to humanitarian files, such as purchasing medicines for cancer patients, disbursing financial allocations for hospitals, and approving financial compensations for military and security institutions, it deepened the rift between the “Free Patriotic Movement” (led by MP Gibran Bassil) and the Prime Minister, and threatened to dismantle the understanding between the “Movement” and “Hezbollah.” Thus, any government decision regarding appointments in sensitive positions, especially Christian ones, will inflame the relationship among all these components.
However, an advisor to Mikati mentioned that "highlighting the disagreement as being between the Prime Minister and the Free Patriotic Movement is erroneous, as the real problem lies between this movement and the Constitution.” He adds: “When Gibran Bassil refuses the Cabinet meeting in the absence of the President, it reflects a political position rather than a constitutional one; its aim is to control key aspects of the state and assert political decision-making.” Nahas concludes by stating: “The Prime Minister will carry out his duties beyond all political battles, and the battle over the presidential vacuum will not extend to the Cabinet.”
Any government step towards appointments while ignoring the veto imposed by the “Movement,” as it represents the most significant Christian presence within the government, will have negative repercussions, including the potential for public mobilization. However, the repercussions of emptying institutions of their figures would be worse, based on the legal interpretation regarding the possibility of appointments and their correctness.
Former State Council member, retired Judge Ziad Chbib, considers that “the assessment of whether similar decisions should be taken happens at the time they are made, i.e., upon the necessity of an appointment; this is subject to the harm done to public interest at that time due to the vacancy of this position or that.” Chbib states in a statement to “Asharq Al-Awsat”: “If you look at the matter from outside the current context and ongoing crisis, the law provides for vacancies in any significant position in the state, meaning when the term of the Central Bank Governor ends, there is a first, second, and third deputy, one of whom is expected to carry out the duties until a new governor is appointed. Likewise, in the Army's Command, if the commander retires, the Chief of Staff or the highest-ranking officer in the Military Council should take charge.”
Regarding the position of the Director General of General Security, Chbib notes “a previous experience when the former Director General, Major General Wafiq Jizini, was retired. Two officers from the directorate took over his duties in phases until Major General Abbas Ibrahim was appointed.” He regards the discussion of these scenarios as hypothetical and maintains that “if they do materialize, priorities will be assessed at that time to minimize the damage to the institution and to the state’s interest as a whole.”
The Constitution assigns the government the task of devising solutions that prevent institutions from disintegrating. Chbib emphasizes, having served as Governor of Beirut for six years, that "the current government must take the initiative and make appointments, even if it is a caretaker government; its decision remains subject to contestation before the Administrative Court (State Council), which decides whether the appointment falls within the framework of caretaker duties as outlined in the Constitution, and thus determines whether to nullify this decision or not.”
Since the end of the civil war, important positions in the state that were held by Christians have shifted to other sects, most notably the position of the Director General of General Security, which was allocated to the Shiite sect, and the Public Prosecutor which was entrusted to a Sunni judge. For years, the Shiite community has upheld the Ministry of Finance portfolio to monopolize the third signature on government decrees and decisions alongside the Maronite President and the Sunni Prime Minister. Chbib does not hide that “there is an impression or feeling among that segment of Lebanese (Christians) that those who triumphed in the civil war from militias and capital forces proceeded to share the legacy of political Maronitization, as a result of a shift in the balance of power, and this trajectory has continued since the 1990s until now.”
He emphasizes that “the solution cannot be to proceed down this path but must return to the Lebanese Constitution and the National Reconciliation Document established in Taif, which enshrined parity between Christians and Muslims during a transitional phase, followed by the abolition of political sectarianism, and confirmed the selection of capable and deserving individuals within the framework of parity.” He noted that “some fears regarding this issue cannot be overlooked, as the experiences of the last 30 years have contradicted the Constitution and cemented the victory of the war militias, not only over the partners in the homeland but also over the Constitution and its provisions.”
The Free Patriotic Movement, led by Gibran Bassil and fully supported by former President Michel Aoun, waged a battle to remove Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh and appoint a replacement aligned with Aoun's team during the latter half of Aoun’s term, specifically with the outbreak of the October 17, 2019 uprising. Aoun and Bassil mobilized all their efforts to rid themselves of Salameh by initiating legal proceedings against him in Lebanon and European countries, with a pursuit led by the public prosecutor in Mount Lebanon, Ghada Aoun, conducting raids on his home and office inside the Central Bank in an attempt to arrest him and imprison him. They launched political and media campaigns targeting him personally both domestically and abroad; however, all these attempts failed, evidenced by Aoun leaving the Baabda Palace while Riad Salameh remained in his position.
Despite criticisms of the financial policies pursued by Salameh, there are religious and political Christian authorities that fear his term might end before a new president is elected, a new government is formed, and regular state work resumes, allowing a new Central Bank governor to be appointed. This concern stems from the potential scenario where Salameh returns home, handing over his responsibilities to his first deputy, Wassim Mansouri, a Shiite affiliated with Speaker Nabih Berri. Sources suggest that extending Riad Salameh's term might become a “Christian demand regardless of the Free Patriotic Movement’s position, so that Christians do not lose a fundamental and important position in power as they have lost others in recent years.”
In addition to appointments and the political mines surrounding them, there is a crucial and fundamental entitlement that the Lebanese people are awaiting at the end of May next year: the municipal and optional elections that were postponed from last year to this year, as they coincided with parliamentary elections, and the state's inability to conduct both in one year. This entitlement will not be easy given the political, financial, and security obstacles facing the government, which will meet with political refusal to conduct them in the absence of the president and may face obstruction if ministers from the Free Patriotic Movement refuse to accompany it and fail to sign its decree. However, a governmental source confirmed to “Asharq Al-Awsat” that the caretaker government “is preparing for this entitlement and will hold it on schedule starting from May 31.”
It was noted that “the call for municipal and optional elections is issued by a decision from the Minister of Interior, who invites the electoral bodies to choose their representatives in municipalities and for mukhtars, without needing a decree, unlike the parliamentary elections.” The government source stated that “all that needs to be done for the municipal elections is to allocate funds secured through the budget, or via a law passed by the parliament that allows opening a supplementary credit in the budget to cover election expenses.”
Members of the “Democratic Gathering” bloc, MPs Bilal Abdullah and Hadi Abu Al-Hassan, proposed a repeated urgent law in mid-October, aimed at finding a temporary solution for the vacuum in military and security positions due to the retirement of the officers holding them, until a solution is found to the stalled officer promotion crisis stemming from the disagreements between former President Michel Aoun and Speaker Nabih Berri. This proposal mainly includes members of the military council of the Lebanese Army, whether they have retired at the end of last year or are due to leave their positions this year. However, this proposal failed and did not proceed for approval.
Moreover, Minister of National Defense Maurice Sleem rejected a proposal made by Army Commander Joseph Aoun to postpone the retirement of Chief of Staff Major General Amin Al-Aram and the Inspector General in the Military Council, Major General Milad Issaq, due to the political disagreements.
