Analysts and reporters in the Arab media are racing to publish reports on how future wars will unfold and on which fronts. These narratives have surged since the outbreak of the Gaza War following the "Nefah Raid," jumping from one analysis to another with a flurry of predictions, some of which have materialized while others have not. These discussions range from the Houthis to Hezbollah, the Popular Mobilization Forces, and various Iranian militias, along with confrontations with Israel. Among the many potential confrontations theorized is a possible war scenario between Israel and Hezbollah on the Lebanese and Syrian fronts, with increased talk about the likelihood—and some even mention the near inevitability—of an extensive Israeli assault deep into Hezbollah's positions in both countries. This direction in journalism has been fueled by a multitude of Israeli reports regarding troop buildups on its northern front, the transfer of forces from Gaza to the Galilee, and threats to strike militias to prevent any attacks similar to what Hamas executed on October 7, 2023.
However, the less frequently discussed question revolves around the limits to which Israel would go if it decided to launch an attack. Those knowledgeable about strategic affairs and historians understand that past experiences have settled several equations concerning this matter.
**Israel's Previous Wars**
Lessons learned from Israel's multiple interventions in Lebanon, before and after the 1979 Iranian Revolution—particularly in 1978, 1981, the invasion of 1982, the successive withdrawals until 1990, along with the wars of 1996 and 2006—culminating in the war of October 8, all these clashes have produced convictions among Israelis and among the Iranians and their allies, chief among them the following equations:
A. Assassinations may provide tactical benefits in such wars, but their strategic results are limited.
B. Air campaigns, even missile strikes, contribute to weakening the adversary and destroying its capabilities, but they do not lead to its final downfall.
C. The only index of success in defeating the opponent lies in one reality: the overthrow of the opponent's regime and its replacement with a friendly regime.
These equations have manifested during Israel's wars in Lebanon, especially with Hezbollah, for decades. Israeli forces have often resolved confrontations through their overwhelming military power and made ground advances when they decided on field assaults, yet they have been unable to eliminate Iranian militias, just as they did not completely eradicate the Palestine Liberation Organization beforehand. Why? Because while Israeli power often prevails, the forces allied with the axis consistently strike at any partners of Israel on the ground, depriving Israel of leveraging its victory politically, legally, and in the media, thus compelling Israel to withdraw without an ultimate resolution as happened in 1982 and 2000. Therefore, there are limits to Israel's capacity against Hezbollah, which are summarized in the weakness of Hezbollah's opponents.
In conclusion, if the Israeli government decides to transfer the battle from Gaza to Lebanon and Syria, it will have many scenarios to choose from multiple times. Will it focus on the party in Lebanon against Syria, or on Syria without Lebanon, or both together? If the goal is the party’s militias in both countries, the Israeli Defense Ministry will need to muster extraordinary resources to cover southern Lebanon and southern Syria. However, if the scenario is limited to the Lebanese arena only, the question remains: to what depth within Lebanon? Will it be merely an air war or a ground invasion? Each scenario carries different implications.
Of course, another critical question arises regarding the international situation. Will the U.S. administration support the Israeli government in its attack, or oppose it? Who will have the final say in Washington, the Iranian lobby or the Israeli lobby? But the most crucial and perilous questions remain regarding Lebanese internal dynamics and the level of Lebanese support for the party. The significant difference lies in the establishment or lack thereof of a Lebanese opposition to Iran. If such resistance does not emerge against the party from various sects, Israel may continue to achieve military victories without a final resolution. Hezbollah's strength poses a limit to Israel’s capabilities in Lebanon and, to some extent, in Syria, stemming from the political weakness of the opposition against the party, as they do not present themselves as viable alternatives but consistently declare their partnership with it, consequently complicating Israel's path to overcoming Iranian militias.
