While the region seems to be in the process of redefining influence and borders, with an open war in Gaza, supportive wars in other arenas, European countries recognizing the State of Palestine, the International Criminal Court pursuing Israeli leaders, formulating an American-Saudi understanding, and Israeli threats of a hot summer in Lebanon accompanied by Arab and international warnings about the risks of an uncontrolled southern front - Lebanon is experiencing an internal cold war amidst an ongoing presidential crisis, as if its political forces are fighting over changing seats on the Titanic. This highly complex and intertwined scene was the focus of an extensive dialogue conducted by "Al-Rai" with Gebran Bassil, head of the Free Patriotic Movement, at his home, where he reflected on the difficult Lebanese horizon, open to the changes in the region and the storm of its wars and conflicts.
Bassil begins by affirming that what is happening in the region is significant but not predetermined, hence the wars. One must not overlook that the Gaza war has gained an exceptional dimension, becoming a fundamental factor in the American presidential elections, given the United States' considerable and well-known international weight. From here, I believe we are not in a time for major settlements, but rather in an era of major conflicts that will shape their trajectories following the end of the race for the White House.
However, one cannot ignore the major transformations that have unfolded over more than seven months of war, notably the perspective on Israel and the concept of anti-Semitism, which has transformed into a scapegoat we have been forced to wear, and because of which we experience injustice and violations of rights under the guise of a fictitious conflict that, at least for us in the region, we have no stake in. What is happening in American universities and in Europe is not ordinary, and the very idea of peace that has been dismissed, absent any real peace between peoples, has also proven to be merely an emptiness. All of this is now clear in how it unfolds, but it is not clear how it will end.
He adds: We are in the midst of a significant struggle concerning the existence of Israel or lack thereof and its role in the region, which has naturally changed. Not to mention that Iran, the key player in the region, is redrawing the lines of where it has the capacity to influence and where it does not.
The significant problem amidst all these conflicts and transformations is that Lebanon is left without a president, whereas it is necessary to have a president to stabilize its internal situation and enhance national resilience against what is happening and could happen. Most importantly, that president must have a voice and be present at the table, not someone else speaking on their behalf, an unacceptable situation, especially since the constitution restricts this matter to the president of the republic. Therefore, the least that should happen in light of this grand scene is for the Lebanese to elect a president.
**A Dual Challenge**
We tell him: The paradox is that Lebanon is facing a dual challenge: the presidential vacancy and the war it has become a part of, alongside Israeli threats of a hot summer — do you fear that the Israeli may escalate towards a broader war? He responds: Regardless of the Israeli issue, Lebanon's summer is already hot. The refugee file, the deposits of the Lebanese, their rights, and the huge economic crisis are all elements of a hot summer. How much more if the Israeli factor is added to the mix, it is natural that fears would increase.
If we approach Israeli options with a balance of logic and reason, they lack the capacity to open a vast front with Lebanon, especially since we see them returning to Jabalia while all anticipations were for an invasion of Rafah. The question is whether reason is what guides the steps of Benjamin Netanyahu and the far-right government. Hence, there is a fear that they may do anything, particularly since Netanyahu is now living on the war because its end would mean his end. Thus, could the war extend from Rafah to the West Bank and then to South Lebanon? Netanyahu could transfer the conflict to multiple fronts. Today, it seems he launched a significant battle in Rafah, considering its entry certain for him, leaving the question about where the next battle will be? This is independent of whether or not he achieves his objectives. This is not important according to his assessment; what matters is that the war remains open for him to maintain his position in anticipation of the American elections.
Thus, yes, fears exist, and this is an additional reason to have a president of the republic so that we can face the dangers and challenges and fortify our internal reality.
We ask him: You relate the strengthening of internal resilience to the election of a president at a time when you have repeatedly called for a ceasefire on the southern front and you emphasized a rejection of the unity of arenas before Mr. Hassan Nasrallah confirmed that this linkage is non-negotiable, and that Americans, French, and even Israelis accepted it, affirming that the end of the Gaza War will open up avenues for the next phase in Lebanon. Should we understand the absence of a closed southern front as capitulating to the notion that no one among the other Lebanese has a say in this file?
**The Link is Strong**
He replies: The linkage is strongly dictated by the reality imposed by Hezbollah, which opened the battle. However, I am against this linkage. As long as I have not seen that Lebanon has gained any benefits from it, I will continue to express my opposition. I am not on the scale of the United States or Europe; if they accept it, they have no problem destroying 7,000 homes in Lebanon and inflicting losses of $2 billion on its economy, but I object to that. So our stance is not tied to the position of any other party or country. If they concede to this reality, we will not concede.
He adds: If we had seen that this front yielded gains for Lebanon, I would say I am with it. If the cost of $2 billion in losses could retrieve the Shebaa Farms or return Palestinian refugees to their land or Syrian displaced persons to their country or secure oil and gas investments exceeding this amount, then yes, I would have no issue. However, I have a problem if Lebanon alone — of course not Palestine — pays this hefty price without any benefit.
We continue: But what does your position mean, given that you have said repeatedly that if there were any expansion of the war by Israel, you support the resistance? He says: Of course, I am with the resistance against Israel. We established a memorandum of understanding with Hezbollah based on defending Lebanon through a defensive strategy. This has not changed, and we did not state in the memorandum of understanding that we are responsible for liberating Jerusalem. It is natural for us to stand with the Palestinian cause, as expressed in the memorandum of understanding and our Arab affiliation, our neighborhood with Palestine, and our rejection of arrogance and everything the Israeli entity represents in terms of unilateralism and terrorism. It is not coincidental that Netanyahu and his defense minister are now under the scrutiny of the International Criminal Court. But concerning Lebanon, we must assess the positives and negatives.
For example, in the marine demarcation issue, we said that Hezbollah's drones at the time accelerated the resolution, alongside other factors, and this is how we see the defensive strategy. The state was negotiating, and Hezbollah was supporting. If an Israeli attack occurs against Lebanon as it did in 2006, we will immediately side with the resistance and Lebanon because this is an aggression against us. What we say is that Hezbollah this time fired without consulting the other Lebanese. Hence, it is natural that I do not bear responsibility for this matter, and it is also natural that, since I do not agree with it, I should have a say in it, whether its outcome is positive or negative. I believe that to this day, the returns for Lebanon are negative. It might be said that the region has benefited, or that Iran has proven something — and certainly, I rejoice for Iran more than for Israel — but in the end, I assess the matter from the perspective of Lebanon's interests.
We ask him: In light of your implicit position rejecting what happened regarding the initiative to open the southern front, does this not require a self-criticism of a party that covered Hezbollah's entire expansion into Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, yet now you believe that the party operates "à la carte" and that you can set limits for its interventions here and there?
**Against Lebanese Intervention in Other States**
He responds: I do not agree with this description. There is no need for self-criticism. This time, we are talking about a war happening on Lebanese soil. In Yemen, the Yemenis did not come to fight their war from us. Even though we did not cover this matter, I stated from the podium of the Foreign Ministry, when I was the Minister of Foreign Affairs and head of the Free Patriotic Movement, that we are against Lebanese intervention in the affairs of other countries. We have always been with the neutrality of Lebanon from the region's problems, a term we coined and pursued.
As for Syria, ISIS occupied territories in our land, so this is an issue that concerns us, especially as we must consider who would govern Syria. All the Lebanese agreed at that time that we should defend our land. But today we are talking about something different, a war that took place in Palestine, in Gaza, and Hezbollah decided under the banner of the unity of arenas to make the Lebanese arena part of this war that Hamas opened. Nonetheless, if this benefits Lebanon, then I am with it. It is natural that I am with the resistance against Israel. Ultimately, it is Hezbollah and its resistors who pay the largest price. If this leads to the liberation of the Shebaa Farms, can I be against that? I would have no problem if it became clear in the end that I was wrong in my position and that a settlement is reached that recovers all our rights.
But the reality is that the feasible settlements are clear: Resolution 1701 exists; should I wage a war to implement it? If an international resolution comes out saying that the Shebaa Farms should be liberated and claiming the return of Palestinian refugees, I would approach that with caution. But what is proposed today is based on 1701, and should I fight a war to return to it? If Israel has waged war against us and I maintained that, I would have won. However, if I entered into war to return to where I was in 2006, I would not have won.
**Christian Cover**
We ask him: There has always been an approach based on the idea that Hezbollah needs Christian cover, whether for internal roles or regional ones or for its arms. Does your position rejecting the unity of arenas, a position shared by most Christian parties, not indicate that Hezbollah is behaving as if it no longer needs this cover, and does this not necessitate a re-evaluation based on this new development? He answers: Some people suggest that if Hezbollah were to provide us with what we want for the presidency and the government, our stance on the southern front would be different. I tell them that the matters are inverted. These are two completely separate issues. The erroneous linkage that occurs is linking the southern front to Gaza, and the even more erroneous linkage is connecting the presidency in Lebanon to a Gaza war whose conclusion we do not know.
In our view, neither Hezbollah nor anyone in Lebanon can live without internal cover. They can have their internal strength that grants them legitimacy and representation, which Hezbollah indeed enjoys, but no one in Lebanon can live in isolation. Some Christians tried this, and we saw what happened to them. Now, if someone else tries it, they too will reach the same result. In a country like Lebanon, cover for one another is a necessity, given its diversity and nature. Whoever thinks they no longer need cover is mistaken; they cannot face the external pressures while being internally isolated, nor will they be able to achieve anything domestically on their own. Therefore, if they win against the whole world while the internal equations are as they currently are in the parliament, what can they change in them? Hence, I believe waiting for the results of the Gaza war is a losing bet for Lebanon because we are losing time without any positive yield. Whether Hezbollah wins or loses the war, I will not change my position regarding the presidency, and I will remain committed to living with them. I do not want them to lose, and if they win, I will resist more because Lebanon must ultimately live in its internal dimension and not just in the external one. If the party loses, I will live with them, and we will share the land, calamities, and accomplishments we will achieve. In my opinion, one of the great mistakes in Lebanon is linking matters together. We may differ on issues with the outside while simultaneously working on the presidency because we need a state president, which has nothing to do with the Gaza war.
We tell him: Le Drian will be in Beirut next week, and Lebanon and its presidential crisis are central to a conversation between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and French President Emmanuel Macron, and will also be on the table of the Biden-Macron meeting in June, with the quintet committee laying down a roadmap for completing the presidential entitlement. All this momentum and the presidential file do not suggest that there is an imminent breakthrough amid the relaxation of the Lebanese political forces. Where's the lock and key? Is it linking the file with the Gaza war, or is in the hands of the Shiite duo and their insistence on the choice of Sleiman Frangieh? Bassil replies: "We do not concede to slumber or complacency; we consider that all waiting is deadly. However, we cannot achieve a solution alone. We try to persuade others to agree on a name for the presidency, or let us go to successive rounds until we reach an election, either through consensus or competition. Certainly, consensus is preferred because it ensures success. Competition may lead to a president but does not provide the conditions for his success. So we do not concede to a state of waiting, and frankly, we are working, but we cannot control the positions of others. Hence, we say we are for consultation, hoping it will lead to a result. In reality, we are in constant touch with all parties, sometimes silently, other times taking the form of public action or initiatives, or otherwise. We are in a state of consultation with everyone, and the moment we see an opportunity for finding some dynamics and moving the file, we will not hold back."
**Structural Conflict**
We continue: It is evident that there is a structural conflict over the exit for the crisis, whether through limited consultation leading to consensus on a name or a short list of candidates followed by an open session with successive rounds as expressed by the quintet, or President Nabih Berri's insistence on consultation under his chairmanship and subsequent open sessions in succession — this conflict holds significant political meaning. He replies: Frankly, in my opinion, all this is just passing time. The conflict is whether there is a political will to elect a president or not. Whether there is a will to ensure the arrival of a president who will succeed or not. Everything else is just idle play. The reality today, before and after Gaza, is that the duo (Hezbollah and President Berri) cannot secure the election of their candidate, and we alone, wherever we are, as a single part or parts, have been unable to secure the elevation of the candidate we supported. Either both teams concede that they cannot bring forth their proposed candidate - and we concede, and the other team is also required to concede - and we agree on a third option, or we open parliament for competition and whoever can secure the requisite majority wins. I do not accept, based on sovereign, national, and Lebanese dimensions, to link the presidency file to another matter. I repeat, I have the intention to seek consensus, and if it is not available to others, we resort to competition.
What do you have that is different from you? Exhaustion? Bassil replies: There is waiting, and some are betting on exhaustion. However, it is a grave error to think you can exhaust us. I will give an example related to the parliament and the need to legislate. Our position is clear: we cannot participate in legislative sessions with an open agenda as if things were going on as business as usual with the absence of a president. But at the same time, when we see that there is a necessity imposed by major issues so that our participation contributes to solving significant problems in the country, we will go down to parliament under the title of urgent legislation. Regarding the municipalities' extension, because it cannot be left without municipalities, we participated. We contributed to the displaced file, and regarding the substantial economic crisis that opens the door to the International Monetary Fund, all that relates to restructuring banks etc., we have never said anything but that we are ready to go down and have announced that, but the other team has not met us with enacting the laws. Thus, this exhaustion falls on whom? And does the lack of a clear mechanism for handling the displaced file harm one team over another? And do deposits only concern one team over another? All that could help solve major crises for the Lebanese, we participate in, and whatever is believed to pressure us will not affect us. It is delusional to think that one can exhaust the Free Patriotic Movement no matter what they do, even if they remain for a hundred years pressuring and betting on certain matters.
**Presidential Entitlement**
We say to him: Regarding the presidency, Suleiman Frangieh is proposed as one of the four strong candidates that Bkerke had certified at a certain stage—why do you not support his arrival in power? He replies: Legislative legitimacy is granted by the people, not by authority. Authority grants consideration, and there is a difference between popular legislative legitimacy and political consideration. No paper can make anyone a candidate, nor can any designation. The candidate must have one of two things: either a personal strength that makes him a candidate – as was the case with General Michel Aoun – or receive support from forces that enjoy popular legitimacy.
I believe the problem for the duo (Amal Movement and Hezbollah) is that they failed to realize that they cannot impose a candidate on a component such as the Christian component who lacks personal strength and popular legitimacy. Even the candidate in question does not seek to possess one of these qualities. I speak here with complete honesty in order to find a solution, and thus I ask the duo how can your candidate succeed in a term that lasts six years without possessing personal strength or support? And how could the candidate in question, even before the elections, not be willing to speak with anyone, let alone after elections? We suggested that we sit together in Bkerke; they did not accept it; a document was proposed from Bkerke, and they did not participate. We do not infringe upon his status, consideration, and dignity, but this is one thing and popular representation is another.
We ask him: You say that for any president's term to succeed, he must have personal strength or support from those who have popular legitimacy and both were present in General Michel Aoun's case, who gives the impression that his term was not successful. Is that not so? Can we not reconsider the standards of the type you are talking about? He replies: "Let me say frankly… in the larger equation, undoubtedly, (Donald) Trump and America have a larger representational size than that of General Aoun. What America did was not aimed solely at the president in Lebanon; it implemented a policy in the region that had far-reaching negative impacts on Lebanon and much more so than what the president has had in terms of representation power to withstand the influence of the United States, of course. This makes us say that a president may come who has all the conditions for success and still fail because they carried the country on their shoulders.
Conversely, a president might come who does not have the required standards, yet circumstances would help him. It is reasonable in this context for one to seek to secure conditions deemed suitable for the arrival of a president with success criteria, regardless of the circumstances which cannot be controlled. General Aoun was only elected through the support of other blocs and managed to achieve understandings that enabled him at the start of his term to achieve significant accomplishments. From his representational standpoint, he was able to form a balanced government and legislate for a balanced election law, and manage the administration through balanced appointments until the external storm hit.
We tell him: One of the serious candidates for the presidency is Army Commander General Joseph Aoun, who draws his legitimacy, particularly Christian, from being at the helm of the military institution, which General Michel Aoun himself, along with General Fouad Chehab and other generals who were elected presidents, relied on the legitimacy of this institution for. Why do you refuse to support his arrival at the palace? He replies: General Michel Aoun gained his popular legitimacy later, and General Joseph Aoun can do the same; he can leave the army, work on gaining popular legitimacy, and then have a right to run for president, and perhaps we would support him then. When General Michel Sleiman was elected, there was a consensus, regardless of our opinion of him. Our position is principled: the constitution must be respected, and the army institution must be maintained; we cannot break the constitution every time, nor can we say that every army commander appointed is a political project. To protect the army, we want to safeguard its integrity and keep it away from politics, and we should not make it a presidential platform. How can we protect its unity and effectiveness and keep it safe from political harm when it is accepted that every army commander is a presidential project?
We further that the transition from Yarzeh (the Army's command) to Baabda (the presidential palace) is a phenomenon that some see as indicative of the exhaustion of the Christian political forces that are unable to produce a presidential project each time… do you not agree? He replies: No… the issue relates to dealings with the Christian political forces or the Christian component on the basis that what is permissible for others is not permissible for them. We should say let us see who is most representative of Christians to elect him as president, or similarly to what we proposed regarding conducting a direct election to identify who best represents Christians followed by a second national election.
When the Shiite duo says, I want this person for the presidency of the parliament, it is accepted; however, accepting the most representative of the Christian component is reevaluated each time, leading not only to a representation problem but also to a failure to recognize Christian representation. It is now said there is a crisis in Sunni representation, not because this component has no representation but because its representation is fragmented, which leads us to say there is a national imbalance due to this fragmentation, and for that, we supported the moderation bloc and stood by their initiative. We wanted to signal how effective and essential the Sunni component is and how it cannot be ignored or weakened. Other Christian blocs are critical and significantly different from others. The problem is that they are not recognized.
I say frankly that if General Aoun's term had faced what it did, and we do not wish to repeat the experience in a bad circumstance, fearing it will not be successful, we would not have relinquished our right to representation and candidacy.
We ask him: So, you would have run for presidency? He replies: Certainly! But we considered that the country is going through an extremely exceptional circumstance, complete economic collapse, the total theft of people's funds, wars, and displacement… and we said because the presidency is an absolute priority for the revival of the country, we yielded, otherwise we would not have given up this right granted to us by the people.
Does he believe there is an attempt to weaken the Christians, and what is the truth behind what some attribute to him about saying that Christians now represent 19.5%? He responds: Not at all… I have never said anything like that, and I have different numbers, and the voter registration records are clear. Moreover, concerning the role of Christians, it is not linked to their number. If we want to maintain Lebanon and its unique formula, we must preserve the Christians in their full role, regardless of their numbers, because this constitutes the value of Lebanon; and no one can overpower another because of numbers in Lebanon, nor can anyone suppress another. This applies to all, it has previously affected the Shiites, then the Christians, and now it is affecting the Sunnis. This is unacceptable in Lebanon, and everyone pays the price. Hence, it is out of the question that I said that (19.5) or that it is part of my thinking.
However, this brings us back to the fundamental problem; some believe that bringing a strong Christian president is not suitable for them because it takes away from their share and distributes it among other parties, and they want to regain it, thus what suits some is a weak president… The question is, how do you want a strong republic with a weak president?
**Azzour as the Best Fit**
What is the truth about your support for Director General of General Security, Major General Elias Bechara, as a presidential candidate? Basil replies: We have no official candidate unless we announce it. We have a clear position on some candidates we say no to, and we have a clear position on the candidate we support, saying yes to him despite many doubting it.
So, your support for Jihad Azzour's candidacy still stands? He replies: Certainly, and we still believe he is the best fit for the upcoming phase. There are candidates about whom we have no prior position; our stance is that the matter is open for study, and when things become serious, we will announce our position.
We tell him: It is noteworthy in your description of the crisis in relation to "Hezbollah" that you say it has become governed by a thin thread, while you are keen to maintain a warm channel with President Berri, whose stance towards you has continuously been one of the main reasons for your disagreement with the party regarding state-building—what is happening? He replies: “First, the thin thread does not necessarily mean that it is fragile or easy to sever; what determines the strength of this thread is the extent of what remains of the understanding. When it comes to the understanding related to protecting Lebanon, the thread is very strong, and this remains the case. On other matters, it may be fragile, and we pay the price in terms of state-building and partnership, and so on.
As for President Berri, we were never seeking to be in conflict with him; rather, the disagreement is over the known issues. At the same time, we understand that if we want to work in the parliament and enact reform laws and elect a president, we must strive for agreement with him. This is what we have always worked on, and President Berri is being positive, and we meet him with the same positivity. When we reached an understanding with Hezbollah, we were portrayed as being at odds with the Sunnis in Lebanon, which is not true. Is it logical for us to position ourselves now in contention with the Shiite component? We want to be at agreement with everyone within the framework of building the state and partnership. This is what governs our approach towards each side.
