The American magazine "Newlines" has highlighted the competition for the leadership of the Shia sect between Iraq and Iran following the aging of the highest religious authority, Ali Sistani, who is 94 years old. Many fear that power may shift from Najaf to Tehran and Qom, where Iran presents its model of direct religious rule. However, there is no clear successor to Sistani who can inherit his democracy-supporting philosophy.
The American report, translated by Shafaq News Agency, references events from February 22, 2006, to illustrate Sistani's approach in preventing the outbreak of civil war when the Samarra shrine of the two Imams was bombed in an attack by Al-Qaeda.
**Defending Sacred Shrines**
The report notes that delegations, tribal leaders, and Iran-affiliated armed groups rushed to Sistani's headquarters in Najaf, demanding a fatwa allowing military mobilization to defend Shia shrines and retaliate against Sunnis, even considering a fatwa from Iran to do so. However, Sistani managed to contain the situation by meeting with other Shia clerics in Najaf to ensure that no fatwas calling people to arms would be issued, except under the umbrella of the Iraqi security forces.
According to the report, Sistani rejected the demands, explaining that it was precisely what Al-Qaeda wanted: to create a trap and ignite a comprehensive conflict between Shia and Sunni. He called for patience and instructed his son, Muhammad Reza, to invite the three other senior ayatollahs in Najaf for an urgent meeting to ensure a united stance in such a dangerous moment. The report concludes that "Sistani's diplomatic approach succeeded," ensuring that Najaf remained united and, rather than Tehran, provided the leadership for the Shia of Iraq. His refusal to deploy militias, even under the most challenging circumstances, helped prevent a widespread civil war and strengthened Najaf's position in the new Iraq.
The report highlights the stark differences between Sistani's approach and that of the most powerful Shia clerics in Iran, who advocate for direct religious rule and often push for strong interventions. Meanwhile, Sistani has always defended the authority of the people and stability throughout a period of upheaval and turmoil. Now approaching 94, Iraqis and Shia worldwide question what will happen next and whether Iran's direct religious governance model will dominate the Shia world, or if Sistani, lacking a clear successor, will be able to pass on his pro-democracy philosophy to the next generation.
**"A Man of God in Iraq"**
The report cites a book titled "A Man of God in Iraq: The Life and Leadership of Ayatollah Ali Sistani," published in 2023, concluding that Sistani's legacy goes beyond ideas and extends to networks and institutions with lasting power. This legacy increases the likelihood of his vision continuing, despite the rising competition between Iranian and Iraqi concepts of Shia Islam in the coming years.
The report considers the Samarra incident a spotlight on the competition between the two main centers of Shia religious authority, with Sistani leading one side and Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei leading the other. However, nearly two decades later, the two poles in Iraq and Iran still differ significantly in their political philosophies. While Iran hopes to be the champion of Shia Muslims worldwide, Najaf, the spiritual capital of Shia Islam, and its scholarly seminary, have been sources of religious leadership that avoid formalizing religion's role in politics, contrasting with Tehran's approach of a theocratic state based on Khomeini's version of "Wilayat al-Faqih."
**Sistani and Wilayat al-Faqih**
The report emphasizes that Sistani's position contrasts with that of Tehran. For over 20 years, there has been competition between Najaf and the Iranian regime for the hearts and minds of Shia Muslims. Iran has tried to enhance its presence in Najaf by sponsoring students in religious seminaries, investing in construction projects in holy cities, and building a network of armed groups loyal to Khamenei.
Tehran has been unable to sideline Sistani, whose calm political style in Iraq has earned him admirers and led Iranians to question their political system. The report notes that the issue is not only that Sistani insists that the context of Iraq is unsuitable for the establishment of an Islamic government, but he also does not want the Iranian Islamic government to encroach upon Iraq or encourage the development of a similar system.
Sistani's 2004 statement serves as a guarantee against the emergence of a Khomeini-style theocracy in Iraq: "As long as I am alive, the Iranian experience will not be repeated in Iraq." The report suggests that Tehran faces particular challenges for two primary reasons: first, there is a higher authority than Khamenei with a larger following and greater international influence, potentially limiting Khamenei's power outside Iran; second, Sistani can influence Iranian citizens, who can now clearly see an alternative model for the role of a religious authority in the Islamic community.
This competition is why Iran has been working to influence Najaf and explore possibilities to strengthen its position there after Sistani's passing. Khamenei has maintained an office in Najaf since 2004, and his current representative in Iraq, Mojtaba Hosseini, oversees an initiative to recruit more students in Iran-affiliated schools, offering much higher salaries than those in Najaf.
The report notes several Iranian attempts to reaffirm the authority of the Iranian Supreme Leader in Iraq and elsewhere. Nonetheless, Iranian officials, including Khamenei himself, are also keen to display public respect for Sistani, acknowledging that his authority and position are nearly impossible to challenge. For example, Iran had no choice but to accept Nouri al-Maliki’s inability to remain Prime Minister when Sistani forced him to resign in 2014.
Thus, the report concludes that "the strategically most critical period for Iran will be after Sistani's departure, as at this point, Tehran may be able to exert more influence and possibly shape the emergence of the next religious authorities." It noted, however, that Sistani has already taken steps to limit such attempts by increasing the number of students and teachers in Najaf's seminary, investing in facilities and salaries, and through his control over shrines and the tremendous expansion of their activities and finances, making Iraq the most natural capital for Shia in the world.
The report also highlights that Iraqi law regarding Shia endowments specifically states that the highest authority lies in Najaf, dispelling the possibility of imposing religious authority from Iran. The law stipulates that the shrines are under the control of Najaf, making it impossible for Iranian clerics to take control, thus limiting their potential role in Iraq.
Despite all the apparent competition and disputes over religious authority between Najaf and Tehran, the report comments that many points of agreement in religious, political, and other matters exist, noting that the relationships between Iraqi and Iranian clerics are extensive, with networks that are largely intertwined and cooperative.
**A Millennial Authority**
For instance, the report emphasizes the recent visit by heads of Iranian religious seminaries to Sistani and how Iran publicly praised Sistani's leadership in Iraq, recognizing that without him, Shia power and, thus, the potential for Iranian influence would be considerably weaker.
The report claims that despite competition, Najaf remains in a strong position, noting that it has been a model of religious authority and leadership for over 1,000 years amidst challenges.
While the report states that Sistani has never revealed his political ideology and that it is difficult to infer it from his teachings, it points out that according to a representative of Sistani, "Sistani’s stance toward authority is better understood through his practices rather than through legal theories."
Some clergy view the role of religious authority in political matters as akin to a doctor's role, intervening in moments of crisis or acting as a spiritual guide when needed. The report continues that during 2003 and 2004, Sistani repeatedly stated that the form of government in Iraq should be determined by the Iraqi people, meaning his view is that the will of the people and their sovereignty are the sources of the legitimacy of the political system.
This cornerstone of popular sovereignty in Sistani's political theory regarding Iraq is what many writers have termed "Wilayat al-Ummah," or "the authority of the people," which contrasts with Wilayat al-Faqih, or more precisely, it is "the will of the nation," emphasizing the people's right and authority to choose the system they deem appropriate for their circumstances.
The report recalls Sistani's response in August 2003 to a question about the type of political system he found suitable for Iraq, where he replied, "A system that adopts the principle of shura, pluralism, and respects the rights of all citizens."
Interestingly, Sistani has never used the terms "democracy," "secularism," or "civil state," as they do not conform with the language and traditions of Shia jurisprudence, although democracy and civil rights are prominently mentioned in the constitution that Sistani supports.
The report adds that Sistani's views on these matters do not imply that he is liberal and supports extreme freedoms that do not align with Islamic values. Regarding the role of Islam, the report states that Sistani does not call for an Islamic political system but advocates for a government that respects Islamic principles and values, which usually means a government that does not violate Islamic Sharia.
The report indicates that Sistani's influence on Iraq is undervalued and that his efforts to prevent the country from total collapse deserve more recognition.
**Sistani's Model**
It emphasizes key moments in Iraq's history stamped by Sistani's influence, such as his opposition to the American plan to impose a government and constitution on Iraq, his push for elections as soon as possible so Iraqis could determine their future, his refusal to approve retaliatory actions during the civil war in 2006, his fatwa urging volunteers to fight against ISIS in 2014, and his calls for the dismissal of government heads who lost public trust due to weak and corrupt governance.
The report concludes that Sistani has created a model for what a religious authority should embody:
1. Avoiding official involvement in politics.
2. Ensuring that the sovereignty of the Iraqi people is paramount and that their wishes are expressed freely.
3. Providing guidance to politicians without allying with any of them.
4. Maintaining the institution's power and prestige by controlling the shrines and religious seminaries and refraining from meddling in every public issue.
5. Acting as a leader for all Iraqis and their interests, regardless of religion or ethnicity.
6. Intervening in politics only when the "social fabric" is threatened or to address the most pressing issues faced by the state.
The report affirms that Sistani played a pivotal role in preventing Iraq from collapsing into complete chaos or civil war, adding that both the United States and Iran are pleased with his presence due to the stability he provides and are concerned about what will happen after his departure.
The report questions whether Sistani's successor will transition smoothly or if the situation will be more complex. It states, "Sistani's stature is so great that it is almost impossible to envision an alternative." It adds that the Iranian state may attempt to wrest leadership from Najaf and portray Khamenei or his successor as a global leader for Shia Muslims, including Shia Muslims in Iraq.
The report concludes that the question of whether the religious authority might shift to Qom is debated, emphasizing that it will remain in Najaf. Although there may be more high-ranking religious authorities in Iran compared to Najaf after Sistani's death, Najaf has historically been the heart of Shia religious authority throughout history.
It argues that even if no high religious authority arises in Najaf, religious authority over Shia in Iraq cannot emanate from Iran, especially regarding political affairs and the management of shrines and seminaries.
The report concludes that the "Sistani model" serves as a crucial guide for any future religious authority in Najaf and ensures that his successors have a clear path to navigate religion's role in politics. It adds that it may not suit Iran for the Iraqi variant of Shia Islam to ascend, yet the reality remains that Sistani and his prospective successors will likely maintain Najaf as the capital of Shia Islam rather than Iran and its model of direct religious governance.
