I will start in October with documenting what I remember from three unique sites, recording the events and historical paths in their decisions that touch the life of Kuwait, articulate its interests, defend its positions, and adopt an approach born from the leadership's convictions, which is deemed the right way to secure Kuwait's interests, especially in the period that directly followed Kuwait's independence, and the crisis that emerged from the declaration of independence that threatened Kuwait's existence as a state, entity, and identity, while wrongdoing its history and hurting the pride of the Kuwaiti people.
Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1963, and in December of that year, the Arab Follow-Up Committee for Palestinian Refugees, affiliated with the Arab League, held its meeting in Cairo. As a surprise, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assigned me to lead the Kuwaiti delegation to attend that meeting, which concerned everyone, particularly the Arab countries hosting refugees: Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt. The surprise of the first session came when the Egyptian delegate distributed a memo stating that there was an Australian delegation meeting with Palestinians in one of Kuwait's hotels, searching for suitable talents to entice them to immigrate to Australia. I was shocked by this behavior, which did not align with the relations between the two countries; the Egyptian embassy could have simply informed the Kuwaiti officials, and the matter would have ended.
The reaction was a strong rebuke expressed by His Excellency Minister Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad during his meeting with the Egyptian ambassador, and the issue concluded with a reaffirmation of goodwill. I returned to Kuwait, reporting to the late Deputy Abdul Rahman Al-Ateeqi with the details, and he took me to meet Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad for the first time in my life. After that, I served as the head of the deputy's office and then moved on to become the director of the minister's office, where I remained for seven years from January 1964 to September 1971.
During this period, the map of Kuwaiti diplomacy was completed, with its biggest objective being the normalization of relations with Iraq following the fall of Qassem in February 1963, and the exchange of visits between officials from both countries. Sheikh Sabah prioritized this file, as he visited Baghdad immediately after the formation of the revolutionary government, from which a statement was issued denouncing the methods and claims of Qassem's regime, marking a complete Kuwaiti shift that positioned Kuwaiti-Arab relations as the backbone to launching Kuwaiti diplomatic efforts. Moreover, Sheikh Sabah opened up in his noble endeavors, volunteering to mediate in Arab disputes, believing that this was Kuwait’s destiny, dedicating his life and resources available in Kuwait to ensure the success of his missions.
From these convictions, which dominated the Arab files, Kuwait’s role in addressing Arab concerns was encapsulated. Kuwait shifted its relationship with Britain from a historical ally to a friend holding a significant position in life; however, this relationship was largely closed with Kuwait's accession to the Arab League in July 1961, with its decision being almost conditional upon the notion that Kuwait's security, sovereignty, and independence were strictly Arab matters, prohibiting foreign interference in Kuwaiti affairs.
During my time in the minister's office, relations with Iraq took precedence, alongside Sheikh Sabah's initiatives to create proposals and ideas to present in his Arab mediation efforts, primarily his endeavors to contain and resolve the confrontations between revolutionary Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
In 1971, I moved to the United Nations as Kuwait's permanent representative, accompanying Sheikh Sabah to attend the annual sessions of the UN. Thus, I gained a general understanding, though lacking in details, of how the organization operated. However, the most important aspect was the international presence in its halls, with global leaders expressing their positions through speeches about global issues.
Here, countries and their representatives feel that the world is interconnected regarding its interests and that the grand task is to secure peace through solutions to problems, while focusing on development; global stability and security are inseparable. Nevertheless, despite this awareness of the interconnection among peoples, the United Nations is a battleground for interests among nations. There are no ideologies in its files, nor terms like Arab nation or African unity; the focus is solely on the benefits sought by each state and homeland.
There are interests in building a wall of global peace; however, no agreement exists on the mechanisms to achieve it, nor is there consensus on its contents. These realities seldom emerge in nations' public speeches, rather they form the agenda of various committees, as the voice of any independent state, regardless of its size or diplomacy, rises in committees, expressing its political, economic, and security concerns. Among the UN's most important contents is the affirmation of state sovereignty. In the UN, unity represents coordination among states, not annexation or the absence of sovereignty; the Arab group is a coalition of Arab countries addressing the coordination of positions regarding issues on the Arab League's agenda, such as the Palestinian issue and refugees.
The most significant lesson learned by those working within this realm is the preservation of the state's identity and the expansion of benefits gained from UN membership. I never once thought of transitioning to another diplomatic career path; I had intended to remain for two years before leaving the diplomatic corps, but Divine will guided me to the Gulf Cooperation Council in Riyadh, where the third file opens—representing my twelve years as Secretary-General.
Upon returning from the UN, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad's trip to Moscow in April 1981 aimed to inform the Soviet Union about the Gulf States' decision to establish a Cooperation Council among the six Gulf states. The session with Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, was an open discussion about Soviet-Gulf relations, with Gromyko welcoming the Cooperation Council and expressing support, provided it adhered to the principles forming the base of Kuwaiti diplomacy. Sheikh Sabah's response reaffirmed the understanding among Gulf States, following a path inspired by Kuwait.
On May 25, 1981, the leaders of the six Gulf States signed the document establishing the Cooperation Council, a set of general principles confirming cooperation among these countries in all areas while emphasizing economic and commercial matters; the document did not mention anything about security or defense cooperation. It was all about economic issues, and its goal remained collaboration, possibly reflecting the unity of positions without eliminating sovereignty and identity.
The document translated what the states agreed upon. King Khalid bin Abdulaziz came to Abu Dhabi to represent the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, despite his health issues, exemplifying the Kingdom's faith and resolve in supporting the council's journey. He also participated in the second summit meeting in Riyadh in November 1981 while facing health challenges. I remember his telling me to present the summit's file contents according to the arrangements made by the foreign ministers, stating he had no objections to any of its issues. That summit was the last one attended by King Khalid, who passed away shortly thereafter.
These three milestones will be compiled into a book, which I plan to start writing in October. I believe I can shape and complete it within a year from the start date. I hope my memory will enrich me with many details that I see as beneficial to record in the pages of this forthcoming book.
