Since the beginning of the Gaza war, I have been struck by the impression that Iran was originally behind sparking this war by pushing "Hamas" toward it. In the early months of 2023, Iranian officials and Palestinian organization leaders frequented Beirut to meet with the leader of "Hezbollah," who repeatedly spoke about "the unity of the fronts." Meanwhile, the "Jihad" organization was carrying out operations in the West Bank, raising questions among commentators about why "Hamas" was not involved. However, this impression is seemingly contradicted by Iran's insistence that it had no knowledge of such actions and did not want to expand the war, while "Hezbollah" (based on the concept of the unity of fronts!) moved to support "Hamas" and "Jihad" in their war. The question remains: if "Hamas" enjoys this notable independence in its war decisions, does "Hezbollah" possess the same level of decision-making autonomy?
It has become irrelevant, in any case, how or why the war started, especially since we are witnessing its outcomes and the horrors it has led to. Netanyahu and the Israeli right exploited it as seen by the world, aiming for the elimination of all enemies of the Hebrew state, from Palestinian organizations to "Hezbollah" and up to Iran. However, returning to the reasons behind this situation, it highlights the fractures and collapses that some Arab entities have suffered as a result of external interventions. These interventions began with the United States in Iraq and continued in Libya, with the Islamic Republic of Iran competing in this arena and benefiting from it. Iran has uniquely created a methodology consisting of establishing militias that it supplied with weapons and other capabilities, allowing its officials to boast in the second decade of the current century about controlling four Arab capitals: Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Sana'a!
The fragmentation of Arab national entities has become a phenomenon warranting repeated inquiry. The attribution of this fragmentation to interventions is not accepted by many who point to the tremors caused by the "Arab Spring," which are originally rooted in internal issues that led to external interventions. Others highlight the known American role in the events of the Arab Spring under the pretext of spreading democracy, the same excuse used by Americans to invade Iraq in 2003, in addition to the myth of the Iraqi nuclear program. A third group attempts to resolve the puzzle of differing beginnings and details by combining both internal fragility and external intervention! For instance, they mention the situation in Sudan; the disagreement over internal change between the army and civilian forces encouraged some neighboring countries to intervene in favor of the "Rapid Support Forces" to dismantle Sudan and seize the spoils of fragmentation!
The situation in Palestine, however, was different. Following the end of colonialism, it faced settler colonialism in which the whole world participated, especially the major powers under the pretext of creating a homeland for Jews who had suffered severely under Nazism. When Palestinians began in the mid-1960s to revive their cause, there was a strong emphasis on unity in the liberation project, and with the support of Arab League countries, the Palestine Liberation Organization was created to unify all factions of the struggle. After nearly thirty years, the Oslo Agreement of 1993 was reached to restore some land and build the Palestinian state upon it. However, radicals among Arabs and Palestinians insisted on establishing a state between the river (Jordan) and the sea (Mediterranean). The Islamic "Hamas" emerged from this opposition to Oslo, seizing Gaza from the Palestinian Authority, becoming a militia similar to other militias formed in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya, and like most of them, pledging allegiance to Iran. So, should we strive to understand it as we have understood other militias in fractured Arab states? Israel has understood it in that way despite the wars between them; prior to "The Deluge of Al-Aqsa" (2007-2024), it considered it more favorable or acceptable than Abu Mazen and the Palestinian Authority of Oslo. "Hamas" did not object to this perception, evidenced by its acceptance of Qatari support through Israel!
Where do we stand now? "Hamas" has gained immense popularity in Palestine and beyond. However, neither Israel nor the Arab states want it to return to power in Gaza. A unity government was agreed upon with the Palestinian Authority through Chinese mediation. "Hamas" could return to violating the agreement as it has done before, but this may not be possible after what happened in Gaza.
Here we have an opportunity not available with other Arab state militias: for the Palestinians (the Authority and the militia) to unite again with a national program to work together towards establishing the Palestinian state with the help of Arabs and the West. Will "Hamas" move to implement this program under Sinwar's leadership? Or will what has happened repeatedly in Libya, Sudan, Syria, and Somalia occur: after the agreement, the militia reverts to its former state?! The lesson of hardship is not only a gamble for "Hamas" but also for Iran and Nasrallah. After numerous failures, a re-examination for review and consideration of alternatives in the axis of resistance could be warranted, or else tens of thousands of victims may have gone in vain without benefit. As for other Arab states, all of which have cases and resolutions in the UN, their salvation from militias is harder than a camel entering "the eye of a needle," as mentioned in the Holy Quran!