Regardless of whether the revival of the JCPOA nuclear agreement between the six major powers and the Islamic Republic of Iran succeeds soon, after the U.S. midterm elections, or fails, the U.S. Administration along with Germany, Britain, France, and the entire European Union must take a deep breath and consider the implications of all scenarios, not just ring the alarm bell over the failure scenario. The hope that a global deal with Tehran may help reduce the regime's expansionist foreign policy and curb the activities of the Revolutionary Guard remains merely a wish, not an adopted policy. This is dangerous, regardless of how it may seem to Western capitals that concluding a deal with Tehran is in the interest of European countries thirsty for oil and gas and fearful of Iranian nuclear blackmail.
European governments may be following the path laid out by U.S. President Joe Biden’s Administration, as some believe, or they could be leading the charge since they started to acquiesce to Iranian demands, at times even representing Iranian positions and interests in the Vienna negotiations. What is essential today is for the EU to stop its clouded policies, which act like blinkers that prevent it from seeing or considering the regional ramifications of finalizing the nuclear deal with the Tehran regime simply because, from the European point of view, this regime is no longer seen as a threat to European security based on either wishes or understandings with Iranian leadership. The same goes for the Biden Administration, which seemingly has part of it eager to finalize a deal to lift sanctions on Iran, even if it empowers the Revolutionary Guard to implement the regime's policies, including undermining its Arab neighbors and exporting the Iranian model of governance, and solidifying and arming its non-state allied forces in Arab countries, especially Hezbollah in Lebanon.
However, let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that concluding the deal is essential, particularly to avoid a destructive confrontation between Iran and Israel and to stop the Iranian nuclear program from advancing to the point of possessing an atomic bomb. Let’s say there are many hidden benefits within the international and regional understandings that will gradually lead to a new chapter in Iranian behavior and security positioning. The question remains: What safety and precautionary measures can be considered and adopted to guard against negative consequences of the nuclear agreement on the regional level and to protect American and European interests in Arab countries, especially since the strategic depth of China and Russia in the Middle East is represented by the Islamic Republic of Iran, with which they are forming an autocratic troika?
Starting from the atmosphere in Washington and Tehran indicating there is a serious effort to reach a deal, there still remain obstacles that could threaten to derail the agreement. The Iranian leadership is studying and analyzing the benefits and repercussions while seeking firm promises regarding the removal of the Revolutionary Guard from the terrorism list if it agrees to defer a decision on this request to facilitate reaching the signing of the agreement. The question is: Will the Biden Administration be able to provide assurances and guarantees that it is ready to meet Tehran’s request in the fall?
The formula being discussed involves placing the Revolutionary Guard issue in a separate basket from the nuclear agreement within a tripartite framework including the United States, Europe, and Iran. There is no need for Russia and China in this framework, as both stand with Tehran. Both understand that the Revolutionary Guard is a key player in the Iranian government and significantly benefits from the lifting of sanctions. They are aware that it is, in practice, a direct party to the deal, regardless of the current level of discreet negotiation due to the benefits Iran needs from the funds.
Some believe signing any agreement with Tehran is currently difficult for the Democratic Party as it approaches the midterm elections in early November, consequently, it does not expect to sign before that date due to fears of negative impacts on the electoral battle. The opposite view sees that achieving the nuclear agreement before the elections would be advantageous for the Democratic Party, especially if Iranian leadership stops the contempt and insults toward the U.S. party by refusing to meet publicly with key members of the Biden Administration and insisting on negotiating through the Europeans... perhaps in closed rooms.
The issue of the Revolutionary Guard is not the biggest obstacle currently in the way of the agreement, but rather the monitoring of the Iranian nuclear program, which Tehran insists on not conceding, while Europe seeks solutions through pressure on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a pressure that carries risks and dangerous precedents.
Overall, we are witnessing signs of a breakthrough in negotiations to reach a nuclear deal with Iran that marks a turning point in U.S. relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, seemingly rewinding the clock to the agreement former President Barack Obama made with Tehran in 2015. What areas of vigilance and alertness should be considered to avoid repeating past mistakes? Are there serious avenues to ensure that the nuclear agreement with Iran does not evolve into a complete project of destruction of sovereignty in countries like Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon?
There may be flexible linguistic formulations to deal with the issue of "terrorism" to overcome hindrances in terms of condemning past actions and expressing hope for better future behavior. The revelations of investigations regarding Iran's decision to assassinate the former National Security Advisor in the Trump Administration fall into the "past," in addition to the fact that the Biden Administration will not sacrifice the deal with Tehran in solidarity with one of the staunchest hawks during Trump's tenure.
Europe believes Iranian "terrorism" has ceased in its territory and is eager to maintain that, even if it means appeasing Tehran. As for what the Iranian regime is doing in the Arab region, this is not a priority for Europe or the United States—this is a significant error since the Mediterranean still connects European and Arab countries, through which illegal migration towards Europe continues. Therefore, it is in Europe’s interest to be very cautious about the regional implications of the appeasement agreement with Tehran out of a desire for oil and gas and yielding to blackmail.
The means of influence available to Europe over Iranian behavior are various, but it seems to consider only certain aspects. Europe believes that Iran's reliance on technology and European companies during the implementation of the Iranian "resurgence" economic project will ensure a temporary period of Iranian calm, far from negative adventures. This is the first point. Second, Europe, alongside the United States, believes that reintegrating the Iranian economy into the global economy will compel Tehran to restrain its political ambitions, including its expansionist ambitions in the Arab region.
Third, the nuclear/oil deal will not only prevent an oil crisis but will also, according to Europe, lead to collaboration and partnership between Europe and Iran, where Tehran will see benefits in turning westward instead of being fully immersed in an eastern direction—a revelation of Europe’s seemingly fanciful dreams today. But who knows? Iran excels in cleverly benefiting from both directions, one temporarily and the other strategically permanent to the east. Europe sees that its interests today are timely due to its oil crisis and its fear of Iranian nuclear threats, and thus it hopes and wishes.
Fourth, Europe is convinced that Iran today will not threaten Europe as it did in the past and will not threaten it in the future. The nuclear deal reassures Europe, which is what matters to it. Europe today does not place Israel among its priorities, nor is it bothered if Iran threatens Israel—that is not its concern. Rather, Europe today considers Iran merely a "troublemaker" rather than an "enemy," and this shift presents an opportunity for European influence over Iran, should it dare and be willing to utilize it—or even think about it.
Fifth, the tangible shift away from appeasing Israel is evident in Europe’s warning to Israel that if it obstructs the nuclear deal, it will pay the price. The price lies in its relations with European countries; if Israel loses America and Europe as partners, along with Russia, it will be weaker and more vulnerable alone. What the U.S. and Europe offer Israel is more security guarantees along with the benefits of their blessing of the nuclear deal with Iran—both bilateral and regional.
Sixth, the Biden Administration continues its efforts to consolidate and expand the Abraham Accords between Arab states and Israel, hoping that Iran will eventually become an indirect party when the time is right, whether as a de facto matter through Arab states and parties normalizing relations with Israel or through security arrangements in the Gulf. Europe is a part of these aspirations and efforts.
Seventh, the Biden Administration and European governments see Iran's inclusion as a party in negotiations for a new security regime in the Gulf and Middle East as a means to address regional disputes later on. Their view is that the nuclear deal is a global agreement that can be developed into a roadmap toward a new map of relations in the region. Moreover, negotiations, exchanges, and positioning in the process of establishing a new security regime imply Iran's involvement in the process—and engagement affects behavior, according to the American and European assessments, and somewhat the Russian as well.
What about a country like Lebanon as an example to test Western wishes and to highlight the shortcomings of relying solely on wishes instead of establishing a policy and safety lines that guarantee state sovereignty, judicial independence, and sovereign investment in oil and gas resources?
The initial focus should be on the issue of maritime border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel, which Iran seemingly is not currently obstructing while Hezbollah enters negotiations through threats and drones, involving resistance as a party in exploration and oil extraction. This may reflect a distribution of roles between leadership in Tehran and leadership in Hezbollah. However, what the parties signing the nuclear agreement must ensure is that the euphoria of Iranian victory from sanctions relief does not reinforce Hezbollah’s hold on Lebanon, at the same time that these countries should take steps to strengthen state sovereignty to safeguard Lebanon and uphold agreements that will be concluded with Israel to ensure exploration and extraction rights.
Europe must stop treating Lebanon as an appendage to its interests while pretending to be concerned about its independence. The European-American deal with Iran does not grant either the right to place Lebanon under Iranian guardianship, nor does it give Russia the right to assign Lebanon or Syria to Iran. If these are the features of a global deal, then the devil is in the details, and that devil lies in Lebanon.
There are numerous pressures available to Western capitals with the title of Tehran, if they are sincere in their claim to be concerned about the independence of a democratic country. From action towards justice in the Port blast investigation and insisting on judicial independence, to imposing reforms on all parties. The Western nations have not acted to the level of responsibility. The "Shia duo" obstructs the investigation into the port crime and prevents the state from cooperating with the International Monetary Fund. This must be an internationally rejected matter instead of lying down and pretending to be active with no results.
The important American role in demarcating the maritime borders between Lebanon and Israel is an example of the necessary engagement that should be at multiple levels to ensure that the euphoria over the nuclear deal does not turn into cries of regret after it is too late.
Of course, the internal Lebanese parties are responsible for the corruption and devastation, but the next phase requires major powers to stop solely blaming the Lebanese. They have significant responsibilities to protect a country like Lebanon from the repercussions of a global deal. America and Europe, in particular, must pause to ensure that their regional wishes from the deal with Iran form a policy with rules and ramifications. Otherwise, everyone will pay the price later, regardless of how safe Western capitals may feel.
