The negotiations between France and the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, aimed at calming the situation in the south, have entered a new phase. Today, Monday, he handed over to the French Embassy in Beirut the notes prepared by the "Shiite Duo" (the Amal Movement and Hezbollah) in coordination with caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati regarding the second version of the French paper. This version is based on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701, as it is the mandatory pathway to restoring stability by putting an end to the escalation of military confrontations between Hezbollah and Israel, under the condition of achieving a ceasefire on the Gaza front, as without this, one cannot rely on efforts aimed at preventing Israel from expanding the war southward.
Sources close to the political communications that Berri was engaged in reported to Asharq Al-Awsat that the comments on the draft of the second version of the French paper, which was prepared in English, were finalized last Friday at the end of meetings held between the political aide to the Speaker of Parliament, Ali Hassan Khalil, and his counterpart, the political aide to the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Hussein Khalil, in continuous communication with Prime Minister Najib Mikati before he left Beirut for a private visit.
The political sources disclosed that the comments take into account the necessity of adopting Resolution 1701 as a general framework for calming the situation in the south and stated that there was no room for security arrangements to avoid interpretations that may consider them as a prelude to amending this resolution. This also applies to forming a quadruple committee to supervise its implementation, limiting this task to a tripartite committee made up of the leadership of the international forces (UNIFIL), representatives from Lebanon, and Israel.
When asked about the United States’ stance regarding the French draft presented for negotiation, these sources confirmed that there had been no communication with the U.S., at least from the Lebanese side, since Lebanon received the first version of the French paper. However, they asked: what was the significance of Paris's insistence on handing us the second version in English? Did it want to convey a message that it drafted it in consultation with Washington, especially since Mikati reportedly inquired about the U.S. position when he received the first version, and perhaps he received an answer by it being prepared in English?
In this context, Western diplomatic sources stated that Paris was keen to consult with Washington before drafting its first paper, which showed an understanding of the motivations prompting it to act in seeking to calm the situation in the south to block Israel's inclination towards expansion. They affirmed that this constituted a point of intersection and convergence between them.
The same diplomatic sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Paris shows special interest in the situation in Lebanon and is doing everything possible to calm the situation in its south and to extract the presidential election from the current impasse by electing a president of the republic. They added that President Emmanuel Macron is personally monitoring the situation closely and sent his personal representative, Jean-Yves Le Drian, to Beirut on a special mission to urge MPs to end the vacancy in the presidency, which was highlighted in his reception of the former head of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt.
The sources emphasized that Lebanon holds significant importance for France, which will not allow it to collapse, and is moving at all levels to save it. They added that Washington understands the French motivations behind the paper it prepared to calm the situation in the south and which they view as a roadmap to prevent its descent into war, even though Hezbollah does not intend to be drawn into it.
However, there remain a series of questions, as Lebanese sources following the issue noted: Is Paris acting independently in south Lebanon? Where does Washington stand? What about the task assigned to U.S. Presidential Advisor on Energy Amos Hochstein, in his travels between Beirut and Tel Aviv, to pave the way politically and militarily for the implementation of Resolution 1701 before his movement was paused until the success of the U.S.-Egyptian-Qatari mediation for a ceasefire in Gaza with an agreement between Israel and Hamas, which will oversee its implementation as a condition for resuming mediation? Will Paris engage in the U.S. mediation? Or is it acting in the meantime to fill the void, driven by a desire to secure a place in the efforts aimed at calming the situation in the south, especially as, according to the sources, it does not position itself in competition with Washington, which will give the green light to Hochstein to resume his movements between Beirut and Tel Aviv as soon as a ceasefire is reached on the Gaza front?
Thus, with hopes pinned on successful mediation to halt the fire in Gaza, questions arise: Where does Mikati stand regarding limiting negotiations to the Speaker of Parliament? Has he decided to refrain from engaging in negotiations with France?
Mikati has intentionally chosen to stand by Berri in leading negotiations and coordinating with him on all matters, as long as he enjoys an "open mandate" from his ally Hezbollah, which facilitates for him what it does not for others. Consequently, to preempt any speculation and to avoid holding him responsible for any failures that might occur in negotiations, similar to what former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora faced when Hezbollah distanced itself from the seven points agreed upon by the Cabinet at the time to cease the July 2006 war, leading to the resignation of the Shiite ministers from the government, even though the entire government was behind the urgency of issuing Resolution 1701 that halted the war. In light of this, Mikati's stance aims to secure his position, even as he has done everything required to halt the Israeli aggression against Lebanon, engaging in a wide range of Arab and international communications, culminating in a meeting with President Macron, who opened the door to amending the French paper in both its first and second versions. He remained in contact with Berri even after preparing the comments on the second French draft, as a framework for negotiations aimed at calming the situation in the south.
