President Najib Mikati was neither successful nor clever this time in presenting the EU aid that Lebanon received, which was announced during the visit of Cypriot President Nicos Christodoulides alongside European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, colloquially dubbed the "billion-dollar bribe." In reality, President Mikati should have adhered to legal and constitutional principles before suggesting and announcing that he accepted EU assistance. He could have welcomed the initiative in principle and directly linked it to the government's approval, referring the matter to the institutions for study by the Cabinet before implying that he accepted the funds. This approach would have saved himself, the country, and the institutions from the uncomfortable and outdated burden of empty bravado and competition that now dominates the air and subjects the country to such dynamics.
Furthermore, he complicated the situation by simultaneously announcing the topic of seasonal migration for work in Europe, completing his media indictment by political forces that have been awaiting the opportune moment to stoke the flames regarding the presence of Syrian displaced persons, stemming from the inability to take any serious political steps toward rescuing and lifting Lebanon from the pit it has fallen into due to the failure of Lebanese leadership and institutions.
However, the paradox lies in the fact that attention was directed towards Mikati's hasty suggestion to accept EU assistance, while the root cause of the actual problem regarding displaced persons was overlooked. This problem fundamentally rests on a central premise: the continued disaster and its exacerbation are due to the Syrian regime, which expelled vast numbers of Syrians to consolidate internal dominance. This regime has so far effectively rejected any serious plans for their return. This crucial point, which exacerbates the issue, is often ignored, especially in light of repeated assertions from the Syrian regime expressing satisfaction with the demographic harmony attained after the cleansing and displacement that occurred.
It is worth noting that this modest European aid is insufficient to cover even the minimal needs of the Syrian displaced persons residing in our country, while also locking them into Lebanon for another four years. The reality is that many forces do not want the displaced to return to their villages, where the war has ceased for a long time, due to their continued use as military sites. This includes the map of Hezbollah's military positions in Syrian lands and villages, particularly near the Lebanese border, such as the Qusayr region and rural Damascus, along with many other border areas.
Sources indicate that the ruling regime in Syria does not want or intend to return large numbers of displaced persons to their areas in Syria after regaining control over many rebellious regions. It aims to maintain the current situations while waiting to extract a price for the return of the displaced, enforcing its control over their reintegration with security and political oversight and expecting Arab and Western nations to bear the costs of rebuilding the destroyed homes and infrastructure.
Moreover, the return of the displaced to their areas will not be welcomed universally; rather, there appear to be new geographic and demographic formulations that will dictate who returns to which areas and who does not. In contrast, the Western community is not far from the bazaar of disputes, rivalries, and potential new maps for Syria and the region.
In other words, the elements necessary for the return of Syrian displaced persons to their country seem not fully formed at this stage in the Arab Mashreq region, which is now entering a new phase after the recent turmoil. Hence, President Mikati's suggestion that he accepted EU aid, without considering all the surrounding factors, unleashed a storm he didn’t need in these circumstances. He found himself caught between the jaws of a bidding war and party competition between the Lebanese Forces and the National Movement, both seeking to provoke, rally, and mobilize unrest amidst the unripe conditions for return. This intersects with the opportunism and interests of European countries and the Syrian regime's refusal to contemplate their return in an effort to consolidate control over most Syrian regions, turning the displaced into a bargaining chip in all directions, hoping to reinforce a future permanent dominance.
Meanwhile, Lebanon must endure the difficult and painful reality of the worsening displaced persons problem, the resolution of which remains ambiguous and undetermined.