Despite fingers being pointed at Tel Aviv for a presumed role in the crash of the helicopter carrying Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, and several other officials, some may have unjustified reasons for providing a free victory for the Israeli government led by Benjamin Netanyahu at this critical juncture for his administration. However, dismissing this hypothesis might not align with the various theories being discussed about the reasons for the crash, foremost among them being weather conditions. This Israeli government needs an event that restores its deterrent credibility, which has been shaken following the Iranian missile and drone attack on April 14, and merely whispering or discussing such a role—even if it did not occur—satisfies part of the Israeli need that such accusations offer, while leaving the door open or slightly ajar for these suspicions without denying or confirming them, as has been customary in previous events.
Numerous pieces of evidence support such an accusation, as Iran has long accused its neighbor Azerbaijan of turning its territory into a theater for Israeli intelligence operations. Many Israeli security operations against Iranian nuclear facilities have reportedly begun from Azerbaijani territory, specifically from an abandoned Azerbaijani airbase located less than 20 kilometers from the Iranian border, which has transformed into a base for Mossad. This culminated in the seizure of classified documents related to the nuclear program in the Torquzabad area, revelations from which exposed secrets of this program and highlighted the role of General Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the father of the Iranian nuclear program, who later became the victim of an assassination operation in December 2020, which Tel Aviv was accused of orchestrating.
Conversely, accusations against Israel or its intelligence agencies for involvement in the crash of the Iranian president's helicopter are unlikely to be issued by any official, military, or security Iranian body, even if investigations confirm such a role, due to the sensitivity of this charge and its potentially negative impact on the Iranian image on one hand, and the necessity for the system's leadership to respond on the other hand. Targeting the head of the executive authority alongside the head of the diplomatic administration is no less significantly sovereign than the targeting of the consular section of the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital in early April, which resulted in the deaths of several senior Revolutionary Guards officers operating in the Quds Force, notably General Mohammad Reza Zahidi, responsible for coordinating with Iranian-affiliated factions in Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria.
The second hypothesis, which may share commonalities with the first linked to Israeli involvement, revolves around an internal power struggle within decision-making circles in Iran, particularly within the military institution represented by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps regarding the future of authority and the regime in the upcoming period, amid the absence of limits to the ambitions of any of these factions to control political, strategic, and official decision-making post-Supreme Leader.
The evidence supporting the hypothesis of internal power struggles is reflected in the recent parliamentary elections, which turned into a genuine battleground among members of the conservative movement, expected to express the vision and orientations of the regime and governing structure. No faction within the conservative current hesitated to employ its available resources to weaken the other faction, seeking to remove or at least diminish its influence within the decision-making equation. The policy of marginalizing and excluding reformist and moderate political forces from the partnership equation led to an escalation in the conflict among conservative factions, who found the opportunity ripe to impose their dominance and expand their influence in decision-making areas.
In these struggles or factions, Raisi did not adopt a neutral, paternal, or caretaker stance as the head of the executive authority; instead, he turned into a participant and influential player in shaping the parliament's configuration and increasing one faction’s share at the expense of others, favoring the “Samadon - Baidar” group who entered the elections under various names in a bid to make the parliament more aligned with his orientations and mitigate its obstructive role against many policies he seeks to implement. Raisi’s alliances in the parliamentary elections came at the expense of the "Shana" coalition of revolutionary forces, which closely aligns with the Supreme Leader's directions under the leadership of former parliament speaker Gholam Ali Haddad Adel “the father of Mojtaba Khamenei’s wife,” who had staked on decisive results beneficial for this coalition and its list chaired by Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf. However, the latter faced a political setback within the conservative camp when he failed, with Mahmoud Nabavian from the “Samadon” faction leading the results, securing fourth place.
On the other hand, a different kind of alliance seems to be forming between Raisi and former Revolutionary Guard commander General Mohammad Aziz Jafari, who currently leads the “Baqiyatollah Cultural” headquarters within the Guards, a potentially crucial character for the near future in controlling the deep state's future. This relationship may skew the balance among the Guard’s factions, especially since it began developing between them since Raisi assumed the presidency of the judiciary through a channel activated by Jafari following Raisi's assassination, taken over by the Colonel Mohammad Mahdi Mousavi, who was killed with Raisi and who had previously been Jafari's security chief during his guard command. Their developing relationship has raised significant concern among decision-making centers within the Guards, as the implications and ramifications of this alliance could affect the future power structure.
The third hypothesis, bolstered by the official narrative regarding poor weather conditions, faces numerous questions raised by many following the details of this incident relative to the aircraft's type, age, and suitability for such a mission, along with the role of the accompanying aircraft and what role they could play in determining the crash site, especially since the fall was accompanied by a fire due to the impact, coupled with the lack of communication from this flying convoy and the absence of a distress call. The scene of the incident, the extent of the resulting fire and destruction in the cockpit and passenger area does not indicate a "hard landing," according to Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi but opens up speculation about other possibilities.
While these hypotheses may seem independently self-contained on the surface, a thin thread can link them and reach a single conclusion: Raisi’s exit from the Iranian political scene during a highly delicate period, and preparations for a multi-front electoral battle, starting with the presidency and the possibility of renewing his term for a second round, and not ending with his ambition to play an active role in the search for a successor to the Supreme Leader.
