More than seventy years have passed since the Egyptian July Revolution, which ignited unprecedented political policies in the history of Egypt and adopted slogans inspired by a unifying Arab thought originating from the Levant. This Arab sentiment was adapted from a rigid ideology into a clearer framework, transforming pan-Arab calls for unity into a diplomatic Arab solidarity aiming to not violate sovereignty. Instead, it aimed to connect the path of collective Arab diplomacy with the Egyptian diplomatic approach. The Egyptian revolution launched this goal, which was perceived as more attractive and acceptable from an Arab perspective than the calls for Arab unity as advocated by the Ba'ath Party or Arab nationalists.
The leader of the Egyptian revolution understood that marketing the unity of Arab diplomacy was a complex task, disregarding geographical dictates and prioritizing interests, while denying other Arab nations the right to forge special relations with various countries worldwide. More importantly, it opened the door to interventions in the internal affairs of Arab nations. Despite this, President Gamal Abdel Nasser embarked on a program to promote the unity of Arab diplomacy and committed to it as a priority of the revolution, which sought to achieve a unified Arab stance aligned with Egyptian foreign policy in political confrontations with Western countries such as Britain, France, and the United States, while ignoring some Arab nations that maintained bilateral relations with these countries for security or economic reasons.
Under this configuration, Egypt's leadership paid little heed to these realities, insisting that those who did not align with Egypt's desired approach would face media campaigns, intelligence operations, and humiliating provocations aimed at those who did not join the collective foreign policy. Incitements arose, calling the peoples of dissenting or disgruntled nations to confront these recalcitrant Arab leaders.
President Gamal Abdel Nasser transformed into a revolutionary orator, possessing charisma in stature, voice, and image, establishing an organic rapport with followers and viewers who accepted his objectives and resonated with his inclinations. Naturally, disagreements surfaced, relations strained, campaigns escalated, and Arab nations diverged diplomatically. The revolutionary Egyptian position was supported by nationalist parties and coup leaders, resulting in deteriorating Arab-Arab relations and escalating conspiracies and confrontations. Conspiracy and espionage became rampant among Arab state systems, and Arab media became tainted with insults and slander.
The media school of Ahmed Said from "The Voice of the Arabs" resonated with tone and aggression, negatively impacting joint Arab efforts. Arab nations engaged in destructive interventions, even resorting to military uses, driven by revenge instincts. The worst of these was the Yemen War and the proximity of the Egyptian army to Saudi territories, accompanied by Saudi measures to protect its lands, leading to growing global concern over the dangers of that era.
In August 1966, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad, the Foreign Minister of Kuwait, visited Alexandria and met with President Gamal Abdel Nasser, along with Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer and Mr. Anwar Sadat. I was present with Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad during that meeting, with the late Ambassador Hamad Al-Rajib also attending. Sheikh Sabah brought a historic proposal, inviting President Gamal Abdel Nasser to meet with King Faisal bin Abdulaziz in Kuwait, hosted by its Emir, Sheikh Sabah Al-Salem. Hopes were high for a different Arab future characterized by mutual trust, clean intentions, and good conduct, with a collective Arab momentum towards comprehensive developmental paths and the establishment of natural Arab-Arab relations.
Sheikh Sabah elaborated on the mission he came for, while President Nasser listened throughout, with Sheikh Sabah emphasizing the necessity of the meeting and its importance—not just for the two countries, but for all Arabs and non-Arabs. President Gamal Abdel Nasser expressed gratitude for Kuwait’s efforts and the Emir's concern, then asked Sheikh Sabah, "You want me to meet King Faisal in Kuwait?" Sheikh Sabah affirmed this request, but the answer was a refusal, downplaying its benefits for President Nasser. Thus, history records the missed rare Arab opportunity to reconnect Arab countries and close the chapter on conflicts that led to confrontations, especially between the two most important Arab nations.
The meeting ended, and we returned to Kuwait as Arab relations continued to deteriorate, slipping into confrontations that could involve external parties infiltrating the Arab sphere. The firm rejection from President Nasser ended the efforts made by Sheikh Sabah over a year that began in March 1965, when Sheikh Sabah Al-Salem, the Emir of Kuwait, visited Cairo, proposing during that official visit to exert good efforts for the Saudi-Egyptian conflict over Yemen. President Nasser welcomed this initiative. After the visit, Foreign Minister Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad took on this responsibility, striving to achieve the supreme goal in Arab relations, continuing his endeavors from March 1965 to August 1966, ultimately closing the file on Kuwait's good efforts, believing that an appropriate solution could only be achieved through a meeting of the two leaderships hosted by Kuwait.
After closing the last doors of hope, Arab relations deteriorated, leaving the situation at the Saudi-Yemeni border prone to explosion without guarantees for containing escalation, as reconciliation efforts faded. The reality in Yemen persisted with a war between royalists and the Yemeni revolutionaries, with the Egyptian army preserving the authority of the revolution in Sana'a, all while risks increased along the Saudi-Yemeni border and Egyptian airstrikes targeted Saudi territory. All this raised the regional tension and jeopardized Arab relations.
The situation remained tense without hope for a reasonable solution or the presence of peaceful initiatives, leading to escalating nerves towards steps that could yield further destruction, especially as Israeli leadership monitored events, particularly regarding Syrian intentions and tracking Syrian army movements, accompanied by Israeli threats to strike Damascus and Egypt’s reaction to ensure Syria's safety. This resulted in moving the Egyptian army towards the borders with Israel, heightening tensions, particularly following Egypt's request for the withdrawal of international forces from the borders, which had been deployed in 1957 to secure Israel's withdrawal from Egyptian territories.
Egypt's decision was a surprise filled with dangers, notably after the closure of the Strait of Tiran, which drew Egypt into an inevitable confrontation with Israel—an act that the United States had promised to secure navigation through as part of a bilateral agreement documented in United Nations records on March 1, 1957. This followed exchanges of understandings elicited from U.S. ambassador Cabot Lodge's statement and Israel’s agreement, validated by Foreign Minister Golda Meir. The war on June 5, 1967, ended with Israel occupying all sites it had withdrawn from in 1957, in addition to the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Syrian Golan.
This war brought an agonizing end to the July Revolution of 1952, and Egypt did not achieve liberation from occupation until after the October 1973 war and the peace treaty. The slogans of the revolution waned, marking the end of the diplomatic Arabism that the Egyptian Revolution had chosen as a path for unifying Arab stances.
