Months after assuming the role as Iran's Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei is imprinting his influence on the country's military and security apparatus. Through a series of extensive appointments, he has effectively reshaped Iran's top leadership, reorganized the institutions handling war and diplomacy, and signaled Iran's readiness for a prolonged confrontation with the US and Israel.
The substantial losses suffered by Iranian military leaders since the wars began in June 2025 have largely driven these appointments. However, they also reveal Tehran's attempt to rebuild its security infrastructure based on lessons learned from these conflicts and its commitment to a long-term dispute.
The emerging command structure indicates a broader shift in Tehran’s strategy for managing the next stages of conflict—centralized military leadership, more aggressive operations, imposing higher costs on adversaries for better deterrence, and closer integration of military, economic, diplomatic, and internal security policies, according to an in-depth analysis by "Foreign Policy."
Negotiations Continue
This does not necessarily mean abandoning negotiations. Instead, these recent military and political appointments suggest Iran intends to blend diplomacy with a more robust deterrence concept, focusing on maintaining and enhancing its ability to harm its adversaries, aiming for negotiations leading to a lasting settlement rather than a temporary ceasefire before another round of conflict.
The clearest embodiment of this approach is the appointment of Mohsen Rezaee as the head of the Supreme National Security Council, the body responsible for coordinating Iran's military, diplomatic, economic, and security policies. Despite often being described as a hardliner or a former Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander, Rezaee’s significance is more profound.
Rezaee has long been recognized as a strategic thinker and institution-builder within Iran's military establishment. During his 16 years leading the IRGC, he transformed it into a comprehensive military institution, developing ground, air, naval forces, the Quds Force for overseas operations, and the central headquarters for coordinating major military actions.
Furthermore, Rezaee's war-time record showcases a more hardline aspect in his strategic vision, especially regarding when Iran can end a war with acceptable gains.
In 1988, when Iran's military situation deteriorated, Rezaee was one of the most reluctant senior officials to end the war, proposing a large military mobilization and a five-year war plan in a message to the Supreme Defense Council.
His reluctance contrasted with other political leaders like Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who highlighted the massive resources needed to continue fighting amidst increasing pressures on Iran's military and economy.
Rezaee later claimed his message was intended to provide a plan to continue the war rather than end it.
Higher Settlement Threshold
This historical background makes his current elevation noteworthy, as Iran reevaluates the conditions under which it might end a costly war. It may be oversimplified to say Rezaee opposes negotiations today, but his record indicates a higher threshold for settlement and a firm belief that Iran should end any conflict only when it has sufficient military strength and leverage to influence the subsequent settlement.
Increased Centralized Command
Khamenei's other appointments bolster this image. Ali Abdollahi, the new Chief of General Staff, has been tasked with integrating the central headquarters into the General Staff for increased centralized leadership and coordination in wartime.
The appointment may also indicate preparedness to address "traditional, modern, cognitive, and hybrid threats."
Meanwhile, Ahmad Vahidi was officially confirmed as IRGC commander and promoted to major general after taking over following Mohammad Pakpour's assassination. Khamenei instructed him to achieve "maximum deterrence" while maintaining readiness for "strong offensive operations against the enemy." Iranian commentators see this as an unusual emphasis on the offensive nature of the IRGC's mission.
More Cohesive Structure
These combined actions suggest an effort to merge Iran's wartime leadership into a more cohesive structure, adopting a stricter model of deterrence, responding to attacks with greater escalation to convince adversaries that each new round of conflict would worsen their situation.
The appointments also reveal the breadth of this martial approach. Ali Azmaei, taking over the IRGC's naval command, now controls Iran's primary leverage over Washington and the global economy—the Strait of Hormuz.
Domestically, Khamenei reappointed Hossein Taeb, the controversial former intelligence chief known for quashing dissent, to lead the Basij Forces, tasked with bolstering "the people's intelligence network" using new technologies and expanding local organizations.
This shared thread reveals a view that sees conflict beyond the battlefield. Maritime influence, internal surveillance, public mobilization, economic resilience, and military power are increasingly seen as interconnected elements in Iran's ability to withstand and deter new attempts at military subjugation.
Strategic Patience
This approach reflects a deeper reassessment within Iran's security establishment regarding why previous deterrence strategies failed. After the US withdrew from the nuclear deal in 2018, Tehran largely adopted a "strategic patience" policy, calibrating responses to sanctions, assassinations, sabotage, and Israeli attacks while avoiding broader war and maintaining diplomatic space.
However, the prevailing view in Tehran is that this backfired, reinforcing the perception in Washington and Israel that Iran is weak, predictable, and can be economically attacked with affordable costs.
Thus, the lesson from the wars since June 2025 emphasizes not only having greater military capabilities but also showing preparedness to use them to impose significant military and economic costs to deter further escalation by adversaries.
Economic security has become an essential component of this equation. Instead of accepting permanent isolation under a "resistance economy," some Iranian influencers argue that war should end on terms securing Iran a viable economic future.
Rezaee, an economist with experience as Iran's vice president for economic affairs under Ebrahim Raisi, emphasized that economic stability, social welfare, and livelihoods are all elements of national security.
This vision explains why Iran now prioritizes controlling the Strait of Hormuz, leveraging it as a future economic pressure point, tying its security and prosperity more closely to the Gulf’s and global economy's security and prosperity.
Iran now seeks to convert its wartime achievements into a more sustainable order that better respects its influence and interests.
Hence, Iran's hardened stance doesn’t necessarily exclude a new agreement with Washington. President Massoud Bezhkian called the current period the "best time" for a deal, still using past memoranda as a foundation for settlement.
Negotiating from Strength
Rezaee seems to hold a firmer position. In his first meeting as the Supreme National Security Council secretary with China’s ambassador to Tehran, he declared the Strait of Hormuz would remain closed until Washington ends the war, releases Iran's frozen funds, and meets other conditions conveyed via intermediaries.
He also demanded ending wars not only in Lebanon but also in Gaza, exceeding what was outlined in prior notes.
Ultimately, Mojtaba Khamenei's appointments indicate a strategy based on negotiating from a position of strength, boosting Iran’s ability to withstand a prolonged conflict, and raising the cost of confrontation on adversaries should negotiations fail.
The ultimate goal, under this notion, is to persuade Iran's adversaries that securing a lasting agreement with Tehran would be less costly than continuing the war or trying to impose their preferred outcomes through military forces.